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SCRIVENERS IN CYBERSPACE: ONLINE
DOCUMENT PREPARATION AND THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
CatherineJ. Lanctot*

I.

INTRODUCTION-SCRIVENERS IN CYBERSPACE

Anyone who attempts to determine whether particular activities by
lay people constitute the unauthorized practice of law will inevitably
confront the central mystery of the legal profession: Why are lawyers
incapable of defining what they mean by "the practice of law?" Doctors
seem to know what it means to practice medicine. Architects surely
understand what their profession entails. Even plumbers or auto
mechanics presumably can explain the basic attributes of their
livelihood. But lawyers have famously struggled for decades to define
what it is that they do for a living, and it is the amorphous nature of the
practice of law that makes inquiries into unauthorized practice principles
so challenging.
The legal profession's notorious inability to produce a principled
definition of the practice of law is reflected in its professional codes. The
1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility expressly noted the
difficulty of giving a comprehensive definition of the practice of law, but
offered the following explanation:
Functionally, the practice of law relates to the rendition of services for
others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence
of the professionaljudgment of the lawyer is his educated ability to
relate the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal
problem of a client.'

* Professor of Law, Villanova University Law School. This is a revised and expanded
version of a paper presented on September 11, 2001. Thanks to the participants in the Hofstra
Conference for their helpful comments and suggestions, and particular thanks to Roy Simon for his
indefatigable leadership at the Conference under extraordinary circumstances.
1. MODEL CODE OFPROF'LRESPONSIBILITY EC 3-5 (1982) (emphasis added).
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The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") did not
even attempt this much of a definition, stating what could charitably be
described as obvious: "The definition of the practice of law is
established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever
the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects
the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons." 2
The new Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers also avoided the
definitional dilemma, contending that attempts at definition had been
"vague or conclusory," and had engendered controversy over a variety
of out-of-court activities. Indeed, when confronted with the daunting
task of giving meaning to this phrase, most courts also have taken an ad
hoc approach, sometimes asserting confidently that, while the phrase is
incapable of definition, the particular activities before it nevertheless can
be said to meet any such definition.4 One wonders whether such judicial
default is motivated by Justice Potter Stewart's most famous utterance
about another ineffable legal concept-pornography-and that nowclich6d dictum: "I know it when I see it."5 Resting a fundamental
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. (2001) (emphasis added). Model Rule
5.5(b) prohibits a lawyer from assisting "a person who is not a member of the bar in the
performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law." Id. R. 5.5(b).
3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 cmt. c (2000)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("The definitions and tests employed by courts to delineate
unauthorized practice by nonlawyers have been vague or conclusory, while jurisdictions have
differed significantly in describing what constitutes unauthorized practice in particular areas.").
4. See, e.g., id. § 4 reporter's note cmt. c. The Reporter's Note to Comment c states:
Courts have occasionally attempted to define unauthorized practice by general
formulations, none of which seems adequately to describe the line between permissible
and impermissible nonlawyer services, such as a definition based on application of
difficult areas of the law to specific situations. Many courts refuse to propound
comprehensive definitions, preferring to deal with situations on their individual facts.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Appeal of Campaign for Ratepayers' Rights, 634 A.2d 1345, 1351
(N.H. 1993) (asserting that "[i]t would be difficult to give an all-inclusive definition of the practice
of law, and we will not attempt to do so," but holding that the activity at issue is reserved to
lawyers); cf. Miller v. Vance, 463 N.E.2d 250, 251, 253 (Ind. 1984) (stating that "[t]his Court has
not attempted to provide a comprehensive definition of what constitutes the practice of law because
of the infinite variety of fact situations which must each be judged according to its own specific
circumstances" but holding that the challenged activity did not meet the definition of practice of
law). For general discussions of the wide divergence in approaches to defining the practice of law,
see generally Angela M. Vallario, Living Trusts in the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law: A Good Thing
Gone Bad, 59 MD. L. REV. 595 (2000); Pamela Lopata, Comment, Can States Juggle the
Unauthorizedand MultidisciplinaryPracticesof Law?: A Look at the States' Current Grapple with
the Problem in the Context of Living Trusts, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 467 (2001); Andrew S. Morrison,
Note, Is Divorce Mediation the Practiceof Law? A Matter of Perspective, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1093
(1987).
5. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Deborah Rhode
noted presciently in 1981: "A number of jurisdictions simply proscribe, without defining, the
practice of law. Other states employ a circularity scarcely less cryptic: The practice of law is what
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regulatory principle of the legal profession on such a formless concept
creates its own set of problems when lawyers seek to prevent lay people
from encroaching on their professional territory.
In some ways, the failure of the courts and of the legal profession
itself to define the practice of law may well be grounded in pragmatic
concerns. The principal reason for determining whether particular
human activities constitute the practice of law is to enable the guardians
of the profession to regulate those activities, or, more accurately, to
prevent those who are not licensed professionals from engaging in such
activities. As Deborah Rhode demonstrated in her groundbreaking 1981
article, concerns about defining what the practice of law means arose
first during the Great Depression, at a time when lawyers, like other
members of American society, struggled against economic dislocation.6
It is not mere historical coincidence that the first bar committees on
unauthorized practice emerged during that time.' In the years since then,
bar regulators have periodically focused on the evils of unauthorized
practice of law, focusing on various economic competitors who had
begun to provide certain professional services that had traditionally been
done by lawyers, such as real estate agents, bankers, insurance agents,
and title companies.' The most recent spasm of such activity occurred
during the 1970s and early 1980s, when the threat to the monopoly of
the legal profession came not from other professions such as banking
and real estate brokers, but rather from lay people seeking to provide
document preparation assistance and other services.
Today, as our profession again faces economic challenges from a
variety of sources, lawyers again must struggle to define what it is that
they do for a living. The issue of what constitutes the practice of law is
at the heart of the three issues that pose the greatest challenge to the
legal profession in this first decade of the twenty-first century. First, the
issue of multidisciplinary practice has at its core the question of whether
lawyers and accountants may be employed together without violating the

lawyers do." Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
EmpiricalAnalysis of Unauthorized PracticeProhibitions,34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 45 (1981) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly].
6. See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly, supra note 5, at 6-8. For an early
discussion of the concept of unauthorized practice of law, see Ralph T. Catterall, The Unauthorized
Practice of the Law, 19 A.B.A. J. 652 (1933). See also Catherine J. Lanctot, Attorney-Client
Relationships in Cyberspace: The Peril and the Promise, 49 DUKE L.J. 147, 198-218 (1999)
(discussing unauthorized practice enforcement efforts during the 1930s).
7. See Rhode, Policingthe ProfessionalMonopoly, supranote 5, at 8.
8. See id. at 10.
9. See id.
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principles of unauthorized practice of law.'" Second, the issue of
multijurisdictional practice also focuses on whether lawyers who provide
legal advice or other services across state lines have engaged in
unauthorized practice of law, prompted by the now-notorious California
case of Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior
Court." Third, the proliferation of legal information and advice on the
Internet, both by lawyers and by lay people, places in sharp relief the
question of whether these activities can be said to be the practice of law.
It is this issue that I will examine in this Article.
I will consider the weaknesses in our current definition of the
practice of law by examining its application to the emerging
phenomenon of lay document providers in cyberspace. In recent years, a
number of websites have emerged that are dedicated to providing
consumers with legal documents tailored to their individual
circumstances. These entrepreneurs have hoped to garner a portion of
the market for legal services that traditionally has been underserved by
the organized bar. The recent economic downturns in the dot-com world
have taken their toll on this area, but a number of sites still exist to
provide these services. As the preparation of legal forms tailored to the
needs of consumers has been perceived in the legal information
10. See Michael W. Loudenslager, Cover Me: The Effects of Attorney-Accountant
MultidisciplinaryPracticeon the Protections of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 53 BAYLOR L. REV.
33, 34-37 (2001) (noting that the controversy over multidisciplinary practice stems from concerns
regarding attorneys and accountants practicing together).
11. 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998). In that case, the California Supreme Court held it to be
unauthorized practice of law for a New York lawyer to advise "a California client on California law
in connection with a California legal dispute by telephone, fax, computer, or other modem
technological means." Id. at 5-6. Birbrower has been the subject of extensive criticism, including
sections of the new Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers ("Restatement") and proposed
amendments to the Model Rules from the Ethics 2000 Commission. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy
that the problem with Birbrowerhas not been with its definition of what constitutes the practice of
law, but rather with a different issue about narrowing the scope of state restrictions on such practice
by licensed attorneys from other states. Indeed, even as it rejects the reasoning in Birbrower,the
Restatement nevertheless concedes that the activities at issue there could fairly be characterized as
legal services, and instead proposes the following rule: "A lawyer currently admitted to practice in a
jurisdiction may provide legal services to clients ... at a place within a jurisdiction in which the
lawyer is not admitted to the extent that the lawyer's activities arise out of or are otherwise
reasonably related to the lawyer's practice ..." RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 3(3). The ABA's
Ethics 2000 Commission proposed a similar amendment to Model Rule 5.5. See COMM'N ON
EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, ABA, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 214 (2001) (Proposed Rule 5.5), available at http:llwww.abaneLorglcpr/e2kwhole rpt.doc (last visited Mar. 22, 2002). For recent discussions of Birbrower, see, for example,
Ann L. MacNaughton & Gary A. Munneke, Practicing Law Across Geographic and Professional
Borders: What Does the Future Hold?, 47 LoY. L. REV. 665, 683-84 (2001); La Tanya James &
Siyeon Lee, Current Development, Adapting the Unauthorized Practice of Law Provisions to
Modern Legal Practice, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135, 1139-41 (2001).
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community to be a growth area, the regulatory concerns it raises merits
particularly close attention.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of services provided online
that raise questions about unauthorized practice: (1) services that provide
blank forms, with instructions, that enable consumers to prepare their
own legal documents; and (2) services that go one step further, and fill
out the forms for the consumers, based on information the consumers
provide. Before examining the law governing lay form preparation, let
us briefly explore examples of the websites that provide these services.
The website that initially received the most attention, at least in
legal technology circles, was the British website called Desktop
Lawyer.2 Desktop Lawyer was the brainchild of two brothers, Richard
Cohen, a solicitor, and Graham Cohen, who launched the site to much
fanfare in 1999." The site provides basic legal documents to lay people
over the Internet, for a fee.14 According to its founders, the site had
garnered an estimated six percent of uncontested divorce petitions since
its inception in July 1999."
Desktop Lawyer uses a software assembly package called
"Rapidocs," to offer customized legal documents online. 6 Consumers
are invited to order personalized legal documents in a wide array of
areas, including divorce, wills, powers of attorney, and sales of goods,
which are described as having been prepared by "barristers and solicitors
who are experts in drafting legally binding documents."' 7

12. See
Desktop
Lawyer,
Welcome
to
Desktop
Lawyer,
at
http://www.desktoplawyer.co.uk/dtbrowse/law (last visited Mar. 22, 2002) [hereinafter Desktop
Lawyer].
13. For a general discussion of Desktop Lawyer, see Darryl Van Duch, Technology from Hell
Challenges, Scares Bar,N.Y. L., Apr. 11, 2000, at 5.
14. See Desktop Lawyer, supranote 12.
15. See Delia Venables, Desktop Lawyer Scoops the Pool, INTERNET NEWSL. FOR LAW.,
Jan.Feb. 2000, available at http.//www.venables.co.uk (lastvisited Apr. 13, 2002). Venables quotes
Graham Cohen as asserting that 24,000 documents had been "purchased or accessed" as of early
2000, although he conceded that the majority of them had been flee as part of a promotion. He
further noted that 1850 divorce packets were downloaded in the first ten weeks, amounting to six
percent of the divorces in the UK during that period. His figure assumes that all those forms were
filed in court; the actual number of Desktop Lawyer divorces filed is unknown.
16. See Desktop Lawyer, Software, at httpi//www.desktoplawyer.co.ukldtbrowse/Iaw/ (last
visited Mar. 22,2002).
17. Desktop Lawyer, supra note 12.
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The customer pays for the document online, with a credit card, and
then downloads the relevant document, along with Rapidocs software."
According to the website, the software
automatically assembles legally binding documents and letters. It asks
you a series of easy-to-answer questions and then tailors your
document to suit your precise requirements. Each question is
accompanied with appropriate guidance designed to provide users with
the information needed to answer the question correctly. Further
guidance and legal information is available through attached
comprehensive user notes. 9
A few aspects of Desktop Lawyer merit our attention before we
proceed. First, Desktop Lawyer is quite emphatic that no attorney-client
relationship is formed with the purchaser. 20 Moreover, although the
website encourages consumers to solve their legal problems without
having to pay an expensive barrister, the site's disclaimer is somewhat
less assuring about the value of the documents:
While every care has been taken in preparing the documents, in the
majority of cases they will have to be tailored to suit your particular
circumstances.
Therefore the basis on which you acquire or make use of any
document is that the document is suitable to be used by you in
conjunction with proper advice as to its application and adaptation for
your particular requirements. The documents are not made available to
you on any other basis....

We will not have any liability to you at all if you use any document
without obtaining appropriate legal advice as to its suitability for your
particular requirements. Whatever advice you receive is the
responsibility of the solicitor or other2 person advising you and we
cannot in any way be responsible for it.

1

18. See Venables, supranote 15.
19. Id.
20. See LawAssure, Disclaimer, at http://www.lawassure.co.uk/lwbrowse (last visited Apr.
13, 2002) ("LA is not a law firm and cannot provide you with legal advice."); Venables, supra note
15 (quoting Richard Cohen as stating that "[fin the Desktop Lawyer no client relationship is formed
as we are not a law firm"). Cohen nevertheless recognized the possibility that "[a] mistake in a
document which is sold many hundreds of times could be very costly." Id.
21. Desktop Lawyer, Disclaimer for England and Wales, at http://www.desktoplawyer.co.uk
(last visited Apr. 13, 2002).
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In fact, Desktop Lawyer also sells prepaid telephone consultations
with barristers, limited in time, for consumers who want additional
assistance." The uncontested divorce package, for example, costs
£59.99, and comes with a telephone consultation of no more than ten
minutes with a lawyer who is not formally affiliated with Desktop
Lawyer.2'
Desktop Lawyer's well-advertised emergence generated some
controversy in the United Kingdom. In particular, groups opposed to
divorce, including the Roman Catholic Church, objected to making
divorce easier.' Nevertheless, as of early 2000, its founders expected the
site to expand rapidly. As one of its founders boasted at an American
Bar Association meeting in early 2000: "The legal knowledge we've
compiled ... is in a centralized location.., and it's easily accessible to
consumers. It costs us little to create, it costs us virtually nothing to
store, and it cost[s] us nothing to deliver.' 26 The financial downturn in
the technology market, however, seems to have slowed the predicted
expansion of Desktop Lawyer.2 Nevertheless, a companion site in the

22. See LawAssure.com, Welcome to LawAssure, at
http:llwwwlawassure.co.ukllwlbrowselLawAssurel (last visited Apr. 13, 2002).
23. The uncontested divorce package costs £54.99 without the telephone support. The site is
affiliated with a prepaid legal plan, called "LawAssure," which entitles the individual purchaser to
unlimited access to Rapidocs services and FirstAssist telephone consultation, as well as insurance to
cover legal expenses, for an annual fee of £199. See id.
24. Desktop lawnyer has periodically generated publicity by linking particular legal
documents to other online services, such as marketing prenuptial agreements in conjunction with a
wedding planning site. See Michelle Stanistreet, DownloadA Divorce as You Marry,EXPRESS, Jan.
14, 2001, at 1 (quoting Richard Cohen as explaining: "[o]ur partnership with Confetti will enable
people to familiarise themselves with possible legal issues which may arise in getting married, and
purchase legal documents in the comfort of their own home without paying the high cost of a
solicitor"). The firm also publicized the availability of a form letter for use in complaining about
vacation travel, such as lost luggage and flight delays. See Legal Aid, PosT, Feb. 15,2001
(Magazine), at 10, availableat http://193.131.112.113/story.asp?/sectioncode-00&arch=true&story
code=358748 (last visited Mar. 3, 2002).
25. See David Norris, Anger at Scheme forInternet 'Quickie' Divorces On The Cheap, DAILY
MAIL, July 26, 1999, at 33 (stating that a spokesperson for Roman Catholic Church termed the
service "repellent" and argued that face-to-face sessions with lawyer could give couples chance to
"stop and think").
26. Id. The same article describes his "disbelief that no one in America had already created a
carbon copy of Desktop Lawyer before he and his brother could import their Yankee-ized version."
Id.
27. See Helen Power, Virtually There, LAVYER, June 11, 2001, at 30 (describing LawAssure
as "obvious victim of the dotcom downturn, and the company will post losses of £6.1m this year
and has just laid off 20 staff"; although it now asserts that it is operating in the black). Richard
Cohen recently explained that the window of opportunity for global expansion had disappeared after
February 2000, and that in his business the bulk of income came from LaivAssure, not Desktop
La yer. See id. He is quoted as conceding that the anticipated domination of the "high street"
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United States that offers legal documents for sale using the Rapidocs
technology is MyLawyer.com, operated by Maryland attorney Richard
Granat 3 Other similar sites offering legal documents online currently
are available on the Internet, although it is difficult to determine how
economically viable they have proven to be.29
An example of the second kind of website, which provides
completed forms to consumers, rather than just the forms themselves, is
LegalZoom.com.3 The service offers form preparation for a variety of
situations, including uncontested divorces, living wills, and prenuptial
agreements.' The consumer answers an online questionnaire, and then
the documents are prepared and reviewed by "experienced paralegals, 32
and returned to the consumer for use. The site contains a general
disclaimer of any attorney-client relationship:
LegalZoom is not a law firm, and the employees of LegalZoom are not
acting as your attorney. LegalZoom does not practice law and does not
give legal advice. This site is not intended to create an attorney-client
relationship, and by using LegalZoom, no attorney-client relationship
will be created with LegalZoom. Instead, you are representing yourself
in any legal matter you undertake through LegalWiz. Furthermore, the
legal information on this site is not legal advice and is not guaranteed
to be correct, complete or up-to-date. Because the law changes rapidly,
LegalZoom cannot guarantee that all the information on the site is
completely current. The law is different from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, and is also subject to interpretation by different courts.
The law is a personal matter, and no general information or legal tool
(which means "Main Street" in American idiom) market was "not happening as fast as I anticipated,
and is possibly five years away." Id.
28. See MyLawyer.com, Divorce, Legal Forms, Information and Services to Solve Your
Legal Problem, at http://www.mylawyer.com (last visited Feb. 12,2002).
29. USLaw.com, for example, offers a variety of forms for sale at its website. See
USLaw.com, Create a Document, at http://uslaw.com/build-a-documentl (last visited Apr. 13,
2002). The website markets packages of documents to be completed online. See id. Its "family
package" is offered for $20, and includes forms for wills, codicils, powers of attorney, and other
documents. See id. The website explains: "Each document can only be used once. Once a document
is purchased, you can only modify it within the next three days, at which time it will become a final,
unchangeable document. All documents are built on-line." Id. Although the website is still in
operation, the continued viability of USLaw is unclear. Press reports indicate that the company's
staff had been reduced from a high of eighty to twenty-three, and that only four "virtual lawyers"
remained affiliated with the site. See John O'Keefe, Hard Times Hit Legal Help Web Sites, N.Y.
L.J., Mar. 20, 2001, at 5.
30. See LegalZoom.com, at http://www.legalzoom.com/index.html (last visited Feb. 12,
2002).
31. See id.
32. LegalZoom.com, LegalWiz Living Wills, at http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited
Feb. 12,2002).
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like the kind LegalZoom provides can fit every circumstance.
Therefore, if you need legal advice for your specific problem, or if
by our tools, you
your specific problem is too complex •to be addressed
33
should consult a licensed attorney in your area.

Other sites offering similar services have emerged in the last several
years.34
One might legitimately question whether these websites garner
enough business to pose any significant threat to the legal profession. It
is certainly true that much of the hubris about dot-coms generally has
waned in the last year or two, and legal document websites have not
escaped the economic difficulties that have pervaded the cyberspace
market. For example, one of the most highly touted legal services sites,
Americounsel, opened to great fanfare in March 2000, with the
ubiquitous Harvard Law School professor Arthur Miller as its public
spokesperson.35 The site was designed to enable consumers to purchase
legal services from participating lawyers for fixed rates, and to simplify
many basic legal services.3 As of June 2001, the company had
suspended operations, and it later went out of business.37
There is no question that the long-term economic viability of online
legal websites remains unproven. On the other hand, the shortage in
availability of low-cost legal services is well-established,38 and many
consumers would prefer to resort to lay assistance, rather than lawyers, if
the option is made available to them. A particularly troubling example of
33. LegalZoom.com, Disclaimer, at http:llwww.legalzoom.comluniversalldisclaimer.html
(last visited Feb. 12, 2002).
34. Similar sites include: National Court Documents, at http:lwww.docupro.orglindex.html
(lastvisited Feb. 12, 2002) ("We'll prepare your paperwork in the correct format for your state and
county, and provide you with step-by-step instructions and assistance throughout the filing
process."); US Legal Forms, Legal Forms, Forms, Form Preparation Services, at
http:llwww.uslegalforms.comlcompletion.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2002) ("Forms which have the
preparation/completion services option are completed for you based upon information you
provide."); Docupronet, at http://docupro.net/index.php?count=l (lastvisited Mar. 2, 2002) ("You
will click on the document you need and fill out a questionnaire. I enter this information into our
computer with state-of-the-art software and your documents are printed onto the proper legal forms.
These documents are returned to you with filing instructions.").
35. See Liane Gouthro, Find a Flat-Fee Lawyer Online: AmeriCounsel Puts Legal Services
on The Web, But Is The Price Right?, PC WORLD, Apr. 3, 2000, at
http:llwww.pcworld.comlnewslarticle.asp?aid=16029 (last visited Feb. 12, 2002).
36. See id.
37. See Jeffrey Krasner, Failingto Get Along Famously: Celebrity PresenceJust Not Enough
for These Web Sites, BOSTON GLOBE, June 21, 2002, at C1 (noting that only two legal websites,
nolo.com and law.com, register more than 100,000 unique visits a month); see also O'Keefe, supra
note 29 (discussing how "[tihe concept of the virtual lawyer has gone over about as well as the
Edsel").
38. See Lanctot, supranote 6, at 250.
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this phenomenon is Marcus Arnold, a fifteen-year-old boy who gave socalled "legal advice" over the Internet, which he simply made up out of
his head, to more than a thousand people. 39 Although he originally
pretended to be a lawyer, perhaps the most telling aspect of Marcus
Arnold's story is that his popularity as a legal advice-giver dramatically
increased once he was exposed to be a teenage pretender working out of
his parents' basement.40 His story may be more about consumer
ignorance and gullibility than about the unmet need for legal services,
yet it nevertheless stands as a powerful reminder of how desperate many
lay people are for legal services they can afford, and how easily
cyberspace may be used to provide them.
Online document providers thus merit a closer look than they have
received to date from the legal profession. The obvious question is
whether these websites are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law,
or whether, instead, they simply are selling information to consumers. In
order to answer that question, presumably we first ought to decide what
the "practice of law" means. Most lawyers, if asked to define the
practice of law, probably would adopt the common sense notion that the
action of a lawyer providing specific legal advice in response to the
query of a lay person is the paradigm of the practice of law.4 ' But what is
the meaning of the phrase "legal advice?" If a lay person advises another
lay person on how to respond to a particular legal issue, is that advice?
Does Ann Landers give legal advice when she answers questions about
the law in her column? 42 More particular to our circumstances, if a lay
person advises another lay person on which legal form to select to meet
a specific legal need, or assists that person in completing a form, did that
activity constitute legal advice? And what if the "advice" comes not
from a live person bringing conscious thought to bear on the specific
facts, but rather from a computer software program?
To resolve these issues, we must first turn to our profession's
traditional understanding of what constitutes unauthorized practice of

39. See Michael Lewis, Faking It, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001 (Magazine), at 32, 61.
40. See id. at61.
41. Cf. Carol A. Needham, Splitting Bar Admission into Federal and State Components:
NationalAdmission for Advice on FederalLaw, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 453, 461 (1997) ("Giving a
client legal advice tailored to the specific facts presented by that client is at the heart of the
definition of the practice of law."). Charles Wolfram has criticized reliance on the giving of "legal
advice" as overly broad. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 15.1, at 838
(1986).
42. See Alan Morrison, Defining the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Some New Ways of
Looking at an Old Question, 4 NOVA L.J. 363, 374 (1980); Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly, supra note 5, at 47.
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law in the context of generating or preparing legal documents, and then
consider whether that approach remains viable today. I will begin by
revisiting an early battleground in the unauthorized practice of law
wars-the saga of Norman Dacey and his Sixties best-seller How To
Avoid Probatet43 I then examine the struggle to define the line between
legal information and legal advice as it emerged during the Seventies
and Eighties, with the proliferation of "typing services" that offered to
prepare the then-novel no-fault divorce pleading. The line remains blurry
at best, as can be seen by examining the recent conflict in Texas over
application of unauthorized practice of law principles to the sale of a
CD-ROM called Quicken Family Lawyer.M There, a federal district court
struggled not only with how new technology should be treated under
existing precedent, but also with whether First Amendment principles
might limit the ability of regulators to ban certain types of software.
After issuing an injunction banning the sale of the software, the court's
holding was quickly made moot by a change in state law prompted by
intense lobbying. Thus, the story of Quicken Family Lawyer in Texas
reflects not only the law, but also the politics of unauthorized practice of
law, and raises the question of where consumer protection ends and
economic self-protection begins.
On the other hand, there are legitimate concerns about how a
completely unregulated market in legal document preparation and advice
might adversely affect consumers. Lay people are not always capable of
determining whether a particular document suits their needs, and relying
on untrained and unlicensed document preparers who are largely
immune from liability for their services can result in harm. This is not
merely a hypothetical concern. As I will show in Part V, the current
controversy in bankruptcy courts over the proliferation of "bankruptcy
petition preparers" demonstrates in microcosm the potential for mischief
when unsuspecting consumers try to avoid legal fees by using less
expensive lay practitioners.
There is ample legal precedent to permit the conclusion that many
online document providers are engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law. But the fact that these activities may technically fall within that
category does not resolve the larger question about whether applying this
law to these websites would raise substantial constitutional concerns,
particularly under the First Amendment. Although a full discussion of
the constitutional issues is beyond the scope of this Article, I conclude

43. NoR iAN F. DAcEY, HoV TO AVom PROBATE! (1965); see also infra Part II.
44. See infra Part IV.
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with some preliminary thoughts about the viability of regulation of
scrivener services, focusing not only on adapting twentieth-century
precedent to twenty-first-century technology, but also on the
constitutional issues lurking beneath the surface that might hamper any
attempt to enforce unauthorized practice of law statutes aggressively
today.
II. THE SAGA OF NORMAN DACEY
Let us begin by revisiting one of the early combatants in the battle
over what constitutes legal advice-the once-infamous Norman Dacey.
Dacey's saga serves as a cautionary tale about the ability of the
organized bar to control the dissemination of legal information.
In 1965, an enterprising estate planner named Norman Dacey self5
published a book called How to Avoid Probate!,"
which was destined to
become one of the most successful books ever self-published. 46 Dacey's
book combined a sharp critique of the existing probate court system with
advocacy of use of the revocable inter vivos trust as a "legal wonder
drug" to avoid probate. The book contained numerous forms for trusts
and wills, with instructions explaining their use." Dacey had 10,000
copies privately printed, and talked bookstores in Connecticut into
selling it.4 9 The book's surprising success prompted Crown Publishers to
enter into a publishing contract with Dacey in 1966.50 The book quickly
rose to number one on the New York Times best-seller list,5 with thirtytwo printings by 1970.52 Indeed, the most telling indicator of the book's
popularity is the fact that it remained on the best-seller list for fortyseven weeks and became the best-selling nonfiction book of 1966, far
ahead of the number two best-seller, the equally-notorious Human
Sexual Response by Masters and Johnson. 3
45. DACEY, supra note 43.
46. See Edwin McDowell, Book Notes, N.Y. Tm_4s, Mar. 7, 1990, at C23.
47. See Dacey v. N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, 423 F.2d 188, 189-90 (2d Cir. 1969).
48. See id. at 190. The book contained about 55 pages of text and 310 pages of forms with
instructions. See N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, 989 (App. Div.), rev'd,
234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967).
49. See McDowell, supra note 46.
50. A Colorado printer initially published the book and it sold over 10,000 copies. See N.Y.
County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 999 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. See McDowell, supra note 46.
52. See Dacey v. Fla. Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d 1292, 1294 (5th Cir. 1970). Dacey had become a
frequent speaker on radio and television. See id. at 1294-95. In 1967, his reported income was
$232,570. See id. at 1294.
53. See McDowell, supra note 46. Dacey later estimated that he had made at least two
hundred television appearances to promote his book. See Dacey v. Fla. Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d at 1294.
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The popularity of How to Avoid Probate! prompted a number of
state bars to investigate Dacey, and to charge him with unauthorized
practice of law. 4 An arm of the Connecticut State Bar brought an action
against Dacey based on his distribution of a thirty-page booklet
advocating use of the so-called "Dacey Trust" and "Dacey Will. 55 The
action charged that Dacey not only published and distributed these
booklets, but that he met with "clients" and advised them on how to fill
out his forms. 6 The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed with the state
bar, noting that Dacey had done "far more than fill in blanks."57 In its
view:
The determination that a given form should be followed without
change is as much an exercise of legal judgment as is a determination
that it should be changed in given particulars. In either case, legal
judgment is used in the adaptation of the form to the specific needs and
situation of the client.58
Moreover, without passing on whether general advice in the
booklets might have constituted practice of law, the court stated that
"[w]hen the information given is directed toward a particular person and
his needs and to a particular instrument prepared for his execution, it is
no longer within the 'general information' classification but has become
legal advice embraced within the phrase 'practice of law."' 59 The court
enjoined Dacey from drafting or preparing legal documents and advising
people about the effect of legal documents, stating that "Dacey's
activities present a sordid picture."''
The Connecticut litigation proved to be little more than a
preliminary skirmish. The real battle was to be fought in New York,
where the New York County Lawyers' Association ("NYCLA") brought
an action against Dacey in the Supreme Court of New York, Special
Term, to enjoin publication, sale, and distribution of How To Avoid

As of 1992, sales of Dacey's book were estimated at two million copies. See Richard D. Lyons,
Obituary, Norman Dacey, 85; Advised His Readers to Avoid Probate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1994,
at 52.
54. See infra notes 56-84 and accompanying text.
55. See Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 222 A.2d 339, 341-43 (Conn. 1966).
56. See id. at 343.
57. Id. at 346.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 347.
60. Id. at 352. The court dismissed the First Amendment argument raised, stating that the
injunction against "'advising and counseling any person concerning said documents, the effects
thereof and the laws applicable thereto' did not deprive him of any constitutional rights. Id. at 349.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:811

Probate!6' In New York, however, there were no allegations that Dacey
had given individual legal advice in face-to-face meetings with clients.
Instead, the proceeding was based solely on the book itself.6 2 In its
opinion, issued in June 1967, the lower court saw no distinction between
publishing a book and giving individual legal advice:
It is clear beyond doubt that what Dacey did in Connecticut with a
small pamphlet supplemented by a confrontation and which was
thereupon enjoined, he is doing now through his enormously enlarged
and radically changed Book. As best he can he makes the
confrontation through the Book by selection, advice, guidance,
instructions, questions, fitting and fashioning to individual need and by
sale and further solicited sale on request of forms to fit a precise need
in a given situation. 63
The court gave short shrift to Dacey's claim that he had a free speech
right to publish his book, calling it "ill-considered.' '6 Dacey was
convicted of criminal contempt for willfully engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law, permanently enjoined from disseminating
his book or any legal forms, and fined $250.65
In September 1967, the Appellate Division upheld the lower court,
with some modifications, in New York County Lawyers' Association v.
Dacey.6 Like the lower court, the Appellate Division saw no difference
between live advice-giving and written instructions accompanying
61. See N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 282 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984 (App. Div.), and rev'd, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967). I
have detailed elsewhere the activities of the New York County Lawyers Association ("NYCLA")
with respect to combating unauthorized practice of law in the Thirties, when it successfully
suppressed a popular radio program, the Good Will Court, that provided legal advice to lay people
over the air. See Lanctot, supranote 6, at 198-218.
62. See N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 986-87. Under New York law,
unauthorized practice could be punished by criminal contempt in summary proceedings. See id. at
992 (citing the relevant sections of the New York JudiciaryLaw).
63. Id. at 994.
64. Id. at 995. In comparing Dacey's "sole emphasis... upon legal advice and practice" with
the ban on pornographic books "commercially exploited solely for the sake of prurient appeal," the
court contended: "Unauthorized practice of law cannot be transferred to the book and by that device
to attain the security of a constitutional umbrella to immunize against the power of the court to
reach unlawful practice of the law." Id. at 995. The court added that "[t]he New York Civil Liberties
Union urges that unauthorized practice of law like libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations." Id. at 988.
65. See N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, 987-88 (App. Div.), rev'd,
234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967). The order banned Dacey from "'advising or recommending to the
public in the State of New York... that any "form"... is legally sufficient, suitable or proper for
use for any specific legal purpose."' Id. at 988. Dacey was fined $250 and was sentenced to prison
for thirty days if he did not pay the fine.
66. 283 N.Y.S.2d 984 (App. Div.), rev'd, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967).
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forms.67 The "advice" furnished with the forms consisted of statements
such as that the form "will be suitable for use" to accomplish a particular
objective, or that the forms are "legally correct... and may be employed
with complete assurance that they will serve the readers' purpose well."'
Moreover, as the court noted, "[p]rominently emphasized on the back
cover is the direction and statement: 'ADMINISTER YOUR OWN
ESTATE! This book will revolutionize estate administration in
America!"' ' The court said: "On the whole, the book is represented and
purports to be a compilation of instructions and legal counsel by Mr.
Dacey, a nonlawyer."70
The court further objected to the apparent intent of Dacey's book.
Although Dacey never gave particularized individual advice, by
preparing and drafting the documents and forms, and by representing
them as legally adequate documents and furnishing instructions on how
to complete them, he "[u]nquestionably" intended that "his advice be
adopted and followed by laymen," which, according to the court,
"constitutes the practice of law." 7' Indeed, "[tihe copying or completion
of a form may consist merely of clerical work but the selecting of the
proper form and telling a clerk what to copy and how to fill in the blanks
is lawyers' work." 72 As to the absence of live interaction, the court
claims that "the book is bought with the understanding that the purchaser
is thereby obtaining legal counsel from an expert who is fully qualified
to give the same." 73 In its view, Dacey is "actually engaged in the
practice of giving legal counsel to all and sundry who are willing to
receive the same." 74 Thus, although the court paid lip service to the First
Amendment right of Dacey's publishers "to publish, distribute and sell
Dacey's views and opinions with respect to probate procedure, with
incidental criticism of the legal profession and its methods," and
67. See id. at 989 ("Clearly, it was Dacey's purpose to circumvent the effect of the
Connecticut decree by substituting here a multiplicity of forms of legal instruments with
particularized instructions as to each form so that they could be used on the basis of his written
rather than face-to-face oral advice.").

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The court cited to Rosenthal v. Shepard BroadcastingService, 12 N.E.2d 819 (Mass.
1938), in support of the proposition that giving legal advice is reserved for lawyers. I have
elsewhere discussed the Rosenthal case, which arose out of a desire to suppress legal advice
programs on the radio in the 1930s. See Lanctot, supranote 6, at 213-16.
71. N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey,283 N.Y.S. 2d at 990.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 991. "It would be senseless to permit a person who is not an attorney to engage in
the business of selling and distributing particularized legal advice to the public on a wholesale basis
when he would not be permitted to do so on an individual basis." Id.
74. Id. at 992.
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accepting the concession of the bar association that the court "may not
restrain" publication of the book "as an undertaking independent of
unlawful practice of law activities," the court nevertheless stated that the
publishers and distributors of the book were actively furthering Dacey's
unlawful activities by promoting his book."
Despite the resounding rejection of Dacey's position, just one
month later, in December, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the
lower courts, and instead adopted a dissenting opinion issued in the
Appellate Division case as its own.76 That opinion had drawn a careful
distinction between the "publication of a legal text which purports to say
what the law is"" and the "essential of legal practice [which is] the
representation and the advising of a particular person in a particular
situation. 78 The opinion further noted that the publication of forms is a
"commonplace activity" and that many statutes and court rules contain
forms to be used in conjunction with them. 9 What was determinative for
the court here was the absence of personal contact, because "[a]t most
the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar
to a designated or readily identified person."'
Finally, by adopting the dissenting opinion, the New York Court of
Appeals embraced a far broader understanding of the constitutional
issues presented by the regulation of unauthorized practice of law. It
characterized the lower court's injunction against How to Avoid
Probate! as a prior restraint, without a "precise definition or even clear
indication of what material falls within the prohibited category."81 In the
absence of any clear and present danger from the publications, and in
light of the availability of lesser restrictions, such as laws punishing
false and misleading advertisements, the injunction violated free speech

75. Id. at 993-94. The court claimed: "Legal advice is not a constitutionally protected matter
and one illegally peddling such advice may not take refuge in the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of expression." Id. at 994.
76. See N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459,459 (N.Y. 1967).
77. N.Y. County Lawyers'Ass'n v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 996-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 998 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The lectures of a law school professor are not legal
practice for the very reason that the principles enunciated or the procedures advised do not refer to
any activity in immediate contemplation though they are intended and conceived to direct the
activities of the students in situations which may arise.").
79. See id. at 997 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 998 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The opinion further noted that there was no factual
record to show that there had been any harmful effect from the sale or use of Dacey's book. "Every
individual has a right to represent himself if he chooses to do so, and to assume the risks attendant
upon what could prove a precarious undertaking." Id. at 999 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1000 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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rights.2 In a slap at the self-protective attitude of the organized bar, the
opinion had concluded:
That it is not palatable to a segment of society which conceives it as
an encroachment of their special rights hardly justifies banning the
book. "[I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind,
although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions."
Free and open discussion or even controversy could lead to reforms, if
needed, or improvement where desirable. Books purporting to give
advice on the law, and books critical of law and legal institutions have
been and doubtless will continue to be published. Legal forms are
available for purchase at many legal stationery stores. Unless we are to
extend a rule of suppression beyond the obscene, the libelous,
utterances of or tending to incitement, and matters similarly
characterized, there is no warrant for the action here taken.3
Dacey savored his victory by pressing a lawsuit against the
NYCLA for violating his constitutional rights by attempting to suppress
publication and sale of his book.' In rejecting the NYCLA's claim of
immunity against suit," Judge Irving Kaufman outlined the First
Amendment concerns that had been implicated by the Association's
actions against Dacey:
The gravamen of the Association's complaint against Dacey was not
that he had given specific advice to specific individuals concerning
their particular legal problems. Instead, the Association acted to
prevent Dacey from disseminating his views to the public generally by
means of the publication and distribution of a book. Moreover, the
book at which the attack was directed contained a critical discussion of
an important public institution-the probate court-and of the officials
who administer it and practice before it.s'
The court emphasized that important free speech principles were
implicated, even when the publication consisted of legal forms:
82. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The book is not of the kind or quality to provoke
disorder or incite one to public disturbance. In fact there is no substantive evil imminently
threatening the public.").
83. Id. at 1000-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
84. See Dacey v. N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, 290 F. Supp. 835, 837 (S.D.N.Y 1968), aff'd,
423 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1969). The district court had accepted the bar association's claim of immunity
from suit, but this holding was overturned on appeal. See id. at 842.
85. See Dacey v. N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, 423 F.2d 188, 194 (2d Cir. 1969) ("We do not
suggest, however that immunity would be unavailable to the Association in a case in which it had
sought to enjoin an unauthorized practitioner from proffering to specific individuals legal advice
relating to their specific problems or had instituted proceedings to disbar an attorney.").
86. Id. at 192-93.
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Nor does it matter that the opinions expressed were contained in a
book comprised largely of legal forms. The argument Dacey sought to
press upon the public-the virtue of which we do not pass upon-was
that the infirmities of the probate system required every thoughtful
person to avoid the administration of his estate by the probate court.
Given this viewpoint, the forms which comprised the bulk of How To
Avoid Probate! buttressed Dacey's argument that the goal he
advocated was not only desirable but feasible. Dacey's book was
therefore protected by the first amendment's guarantee offree speech
and any attempt to suppress it on the ground that it constituted the
unauthorizedpracticeof law must be scrutinized with extreme care.87

Although the court concluded that the bar association was not
entitled to immunity, it also determined that Dacey did not have a valid
cause of action because the issuance of a final injunction by the state
court was evidence that the bar association had had probable cause to
proceed against him on the unauthorized practice of law claim.88
Norman Dacey certainly had an effect on the law, 9 although
whether it was for good or evil continues to be a source of debate. 90 But
87. Id. at 193 (emphasis added). Further, without passing on the allegations, the court noted
that the inherent conflict of interest for the NYCLA in suppressing a potential competitor also
weighed against treating it like a judge or a public prosecutor. See id. at 193-94. The court stated:
We merely note the inevitable presence of a possible conflict of interest between the
purposes served by the Association and its conception of the public interest whenever it
exercises its statutory power to initiate contempt proceedings under [the authorizing
statute] and secures an injunction against the sale and distribution of a book critical of
the profession.
Id. at 194.
88. See id. at 195.
89. Dacey proved to be a tenacious litigant in later years. He brought a libel suit against a
lawyer who had written a review of How To Avoid Probate!in the March 1967 issue of the Florida
BarJournal.See Dacey v. Fla. Bar, Inc., 427 F.2d 1292, 1293 (5th Cir. 1970). The author, a probate
lawyer, conceded that he was "unhappy about the probable diminution of probate income to
attorneys as a consequence of the acceptance of the ideas expressed in Dacey's book." Id. at 1294.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that Dacey had become a public figure by thrusting himself into
public controversy, and that the article's allegations that Dacey had been "convicted" of
unauthorized practice did not amount to actual malice. See id. at 1295-96. Dacey's firm, Norman F.
Dacey & Associates, located in Bridgeport, Connecticut, was censured by the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1970 for attempting to sell mutual fund shares without making proper
disclosures, and Dacey retired from the financial field soon thereafter. He moved to Ireland in 1980,
and later to England. See A.J. Cook, Taxes; Expert at Eluding ProbateCouldn't Escape Uncle Sam,
COM. APPEAL (Memphis), June 1, 1992, at B2. In a battle over back taxes, Dacey asserted that he
had given up his American citizenship on January 1, 1981 by writing a letter to the State
Department criticizing American foreign policy. See id. The Internal Revenue Service continued to
insist that Dacey owed taxes on his royalties from the book, noting that no copy of the letter had
been located and that Dacey had renewed his American passport as late as January 21, 1985. It
successfully persuaded the Tax Court to order Dacey to pay $224,697 in additional taxes, plus
interest, for the years 1981-85, during which Dacey had received royalties totaling $371,954 but had
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what is the lesson of the Dacey story for lay providers of legal forms in
cyberspace? First, Dacey's success in the marketplace is yet another
example of how the lay public both mistrusts lawyers and wants lowcost solutions to its legal problems. Second, the reaction of the organized
bar to Dacey's activities demonstrates the long-standing regulatory
concerns about unauthorized practice of law, and how they sometimes
mask less noble economic motivations. Third, the reaction of the courts
is equally telling, both in the willingness of some courts to suppress the
sale of legal information and in the concern other courts raise about First
Amendment issues. Cyberspace document providers like Desktop
Lawyer and LegalZoom are similar to Dacey's book in that they offer
legal information to consumers, in writing, and do not necessarily
involve personal interaction between live human beings. On the other
hand, online legal document services provide far more detailed
assistance to the consumer than an inanimate book like Dacey's can ever
do. In particular, Dacey's book did not, and could not, make selections
among various forms or fill in blanks based on a consumer's particular
needs.
The litigation over Norman Dacey's best-seller was not the last
salvo in the battle over nonlawyer advice-giving. As the next section
will demonstrate, legal developments in the Seventies created new
concern within the organized bar about the intrusion of lay people into
areas formerly reserved to lawyers, and spawned a new series of
litigation under the unauthorized practice statutes.
I]I.

DACEY's PROGENY: REGULATING SCRIVENER SERVICES

Let us turn from Dacey' s best-seller to a more prosaic form of legal
information-the preparation of standardized legal forms. Although
much of the law governing the applicability of unauthorized practice of
law principles to the sale or preparation of legal forms emerged in the
early 1970s, the basic approach has remained relatively constant. In
general, most states have permitted nonlawyers to sell preprinted legal
forms, and to provide some types of "scrivener" services, but have not
paid no income taxes. See id. Dacey, the grandson of Irishmen, formally renounced his citizenship
in Ireland in 1988. See IRS VanquishesAvoid ProbateAuthor, CFU. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 2, 1992, at 65.
Dacey died in London on March 16, 1994. See Lyons, supra note 54. The last edition of his book
had been published by Harper Collins in 1993 and was in its fifth edition at the time of his death.
90. See Joel C. Dobris, Changes in the Role and the Form of the Trust at the New Millennium,
or, We Don't Have to Think of EnglandAnymore, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 563 n.91 (1998). Dobris
traces the "advent of trust mills selling revocable inter vivos trusts to old folks all over the country"
to Dacey's original efforts in the mid-Sixties. Id. at 565.
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permitted such lay people to provide any advice about what form to
purchase or what information should be entered on the forms. 9' The
distinction between serving as a scrivener and providing advice becomes
murky, however, because of the difficulty inherent in preparing a form
for someone without answering any question or offering an opinion.
The emergence of "no-fault" divorce laws in many states in the
early Seventies spawned a new industry-the sale of so-called "divorce
kits"-consisting of the forms necessary for couples to obtain a divorce
without the assistance of a lawyer.92 Inevitably, this activity received
attention from the organized bar in many states, which took the position
that the sale of these kits, or the preparation of these documents by
nonlawyers, constituted the unauthorized practice of law.93 The courts
struggled to determine whether these activities could be characterized as
law practice.
The Florida Bar had been an early enforcer of the unauthorized
practice of law restrictions against lay document sellers. In FloridaBar
v. Stupica,94 the Florida Supreme Court had taken the position that the
sale of legal forms by lay people was forbidden if the forms came
accompanied by written instructions. 95 However, the hard line taken by
Florida and other states96 became more difficult to sustain when the
United States Supreme Court began to scrutinize other restrictions on the
practice of law, striking down minimum fee schedules in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar,97 and reaffirming the right to pro se representation in
Farettav. California9
The shift in approach to lay preparation of legal forms is reflected
by the 1975 decision in Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist.9 In that case, the
91. See, e.g., Or. State Barv. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 913, 916, 919 (Or. 1975) (en bane).
92. A typical divorce kit might have included the following: a petition for dissolution of the
marriage, a summons, a marital settlement agreement, an order of default, an affidavit of
nonmilitary service, a decree of dissolution of marriage, and a manual for divorce explaining how to
complete the various forms. See id. at 914.
93. See, e.g., id.
94. 300 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 1974).
95. Stupica attempted to rely on the Dacey case, but the court explained that it did not follow
that rationale. See id. at 685. Instead, the court asserted that, since the divorce kits contained "direct
legal instructions and advice as to their use or application," that this constituted "legal counselling,"
and "direct legal advice as to how to proceed to secure a dissolution of the marriage relation." Id. at
687. See also Fla. Bar v. Am. Legal & Bus. Forms, Inc., 274 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1973) ("[I]t is in
the filling out and use of such legal forms that legal advice is inextricably involved and that therein
lies the danger of injury and damage to the public if not properly done in accordance with law.").
96. See Palmer v. Unauthorized Practice Comm., 438 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
97. 421 U.S. 773,791-92 (1975).
98. 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
99. 538 P.2d 913 (Or. 1975) (en bane).
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Supreme Court of Oregon attempted to delineate the activities that lay
people could engage in with respect to divorce kits."° It held that these
kits could be marketed and sold without violating prohibitions against
unauthorized practice of law, "so long as the defendants have no
personal contact with their customers."' ' The personal contact
prohibited consisted of "consultation, explanation, recommendation or
advice or other assistance in selecting particular forms, in filling out any
part of the forms, or suggesting or advising how the forms should be
used in solving the particular customer's marital problems.""'
The Michigan Supreme Court followed a similar approach one year
0 3 but not without debate. In that case, the
later in State Bar v. Cramer,'
lay person had not only sold divorce kits, but regularly met with her
customers and prepared the documents for them.' ° Concerned about the
potential overbreadth of a flat ban on this conduct, the court noted that
individuals have the constitutional right to speak freely, to represent
themselves, and to have privacy in their marital relationships.'5 The
court reasoned that these rights would be adequately protected by the
distinction drawn in Gilchrist between selling forms and advising
customers on how to complete them, explaining: "There can be no
serious challenge raised to this or any enterprise which is otherwise in
compliance with those regulations applicable to products placed in the
stream of commerce."' ' Advice, on the other hand, was strictly
prohibited: "Because defendant offers counsel in the form of
professional guidance to persons seeking to extricate themselves from a
legal relationship, the party represented, as well as the public in general,
has a right to be assured that these interests are properly represented by
members of the bar."'0'
It is noteworthy that in Cramer, two justices of the Michigan
Supreme Court would have gone farther and permitted the lay person to
give advice in conjunction with the forms." The Chief Justice dissented,
asserting that the majority's prohibition on giving advice was "unsound

100. Seeid. at914.
101. Id. at 916.
102. Id. at 919.
103. 249 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1976) (per curiam).
104. See id. at 2-3.
105. See id. at 7-8.
106. Id. at 9.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 10 (Kavanagh, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 11 (Levin,
J., concurring with Kavanagh's opinion).
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and counterproductive."' ' Another justice objected on more pragmatic
grounds, noting: "[T]he organized bar, which has not made available the
minimal counseling which would enable a person to exercise his right of
self-representation, cannot be heard to say that this service which it does
not provide is the practice of law.""
Gilchrist and Cramer reflected the change in position that many
courts took during the Seventies and Eighties. Indeed, by 1978, Florida
had revisited its ban on providing written instructions with legal kits in
Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh."' Although the court reiterated its concern
that "there is a danger that some published material might give false or
misleading information," 2 it limited its prior holdings, permitting the
sale of "printed material purporting to explain legal practice and
procedure to the public in general and ...sample legal forms," but
continuing its ban on specific advice or assistance in preparing the
forms. ' 13 Other courts also followed the approach of Gilchrist and
Cramer, permitting lay people to sell legal forms for divorce, landlordtenant relations, and other routine legal matters, and even to prepare
them.'"4 The general approach of these early cases was to preclude the
lay scriveners from furnishing any kind of advice about how the forms
ought to be completed."

109. Id. at 10 (Kavanagh, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110. Id. at 12 (Levin, J., dissenting).
111. 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla.1978) (per curiam).
112. Id. at 1193.
113. Id.
at 1194.
114. The cases are collected at Patricia Jean Lamkin, Annotation, Sale of Books or Forms
Designed to Enable Laymen to Achieve Legal Results Without Assistance of Attorney as
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 71 A.L.R.3d 1000 (1976). See, e.g., State v. Hill, 573 P.2d 1078
(Kan. 1978) (per curiam) (selling divorce kits, with accompanying audiotape, is not unauthorized
practice of law because no personal legal advice is given); In re Thompson, 574 S.W.2d 365 (Mo.
1978) (en banc) (holding that the sale of divorce kits does not constitute unauthorized practice of
law, but rather is similar to the sale of forms ordinarily prepared by real estate brokers). In Hill, the
court determined that the defendant "may encourage customers to listen to the tape and/or buy the
kit, but he has no attorney-client relationship with the customers." Hill, 573 P.2d, at 1079. The Hill
court also noted: "This is not, in any way, to mean that the product sold is found to be wholesome,
harmless, adequate, worthwhile, useful, etc., but only that the defendant is not practicing law." Id.
115. See People v. Landlords Prof'l Servs., 264 Cal. Rptr. 548 (Ct. App. 1989). In Landlords
Professional Services, the court stated that selling forms does not amount to the unauthorized
practice of law:
if it made forms available for the client's use, filled the forms in at the specific direction
of the client and filed and served those forms as directed by the client. Likewise, merely
giving a client a manual, even a detailed one containing specific advice, for the
preparation of an unlawful detainer action and the legal incidents of an eviction would
not be the practice of law if the service did not personally advise the client with regard to
his specific case.
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Since the issue of lay preparation of legal documents first arose in
the Seventies and early Eighties, various jurisdictions have continued to
try to regulate the practice. The legality of scrivener services has come

up repeatedly, with cases brought against document preparers in a
variety of different contexts, including "living trust" documents," 6
preparation of documents by social workers, 17 forms for wills and estate
planning,"" mechanics' liens," 9 law students giving advice,2 filling out
Id. at 553; see, e.g., Pulse v. N. Am. Land Title Co., 707 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Mont. 1985) (holding
that preparing or filling in blanks on legal forms, particularly real estate forms, constitutes the
practice of law); NJ. State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Ctr. of Atl. County, 477 A.2d 415, 422 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1984) (holding that forms may be sold, however "rendering of advice or answering
questions regarding the manner in which the form is to be filled out will be prohibited" as the court
found that advice had often been inaccurate or fraudulent); People v. Divorce Associated & Publ'g
Ltd., 407 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Sup. Ct. Comm'n on the Unauthorized Practice of Law,
Op. 20, 100 NJ. L.J. 893 (1977).
116. See Fla. Bar v. Am. Senior Citizens Alliance, Inc., 689 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1997) (per
curiam). The court in American Senior CitizensAlliance held that:
Under the untenable guise of "gathering information," nonlawyer ASCA employees
answered specific legal questions; determined the appropriateness of a living trust based
on a customer's particular needs and circumstances; assembled, drafted and executed the
documents; and funded the living trusts in direct violation of our clear admonitions to the
contrary in Brumbaugh and Living Trusts. The particularized legal advice and services
rendered by ASCA's nonlawyer employees clearly constituted the unlicensed practice of
law.
Id. at 259; see, e.g., In re Mid-America Living Trust Assocs., 927 S.w.2d 855, 860 (Mo. 1996) (en
banc) ("All courts that have addressed the issue have held that non-lawyer trust salespeople render
legal advice and engage in the unauthorized practice of law when they recommend living trusts to
specific individuals."); In re Morin, 878 P.2d 393 (Or. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that the
defendant lav'yer improperly assisted noniawyers to provide specific legal advice in living trust
seminars). See generally Lopata, supra note 4.
117. See In re Darlene C., 1998 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 1998)
(asserting that preparation of documents by social workers for termination of parental rights must
cease because it is unauthorized practice of law), rev'd in part, 717 A.2d 1242 (Conn. 1998)
(finding that the statute authorized actions). See generally Anthony Bertelli, Should Social Workers
Engage in The UnauthorizedPractice of Law?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 15 (1998).
118. See, e.g., Fadia v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 830 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. App.
1992); Palmer v. Unauthorized Practice Comm., 438 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
119. See generally Crain v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 11 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. App.
1999). The court, in discussing the activities of Crain and Credit Management Consulting Company
("CMCC") with respect to the preparation and filing of legal instruments affecting real property,
stated:
The preparation of these documents involves the use of legal skill and knowledge. In
preparing these documents, CMCC impliedly advises its clients of their legal rights and
entitlement under the law. CMCC also prepares and sends letters to property owners
interpreting home owner insurance policy provisions and advising them to make a claim
against their title insurance policy in furtherance of perfection of the legal rights of its
clients. When CMCC sends such letters to home owners, it impliedly advises them that
they do in fact have legal rights and should make a claim. CMCC engages in these
tactics to procure settlements with insurance companies in exchange for release of liens.
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forms for real estate purposes, '2' immigration law forms," divorce,'2 and
other situations."4 The cases generally follow the traditional distinction
between simply typing information provided by the consumer without
alteration or advice, which is permitted, and making changes or
suggestions based on the information provided, which is prohibited. In

general, the cases also permit generic written instructions to accompany
the materials. Although some have criticized the distinction between
typing and advising as formalistic or unworkable, it remains the
benchmark for determining whether a lay scrivener has been involved in
the unauthorized practice of law.'"
Indeed, in one state, the dividing line is even more stringent. Texas
case law restricts not only the providing of individualized legal advice,
but the sale of written documents that purport to give general advice
about the appropriate course of action. In 1969, in Palmer v.
UnauthorizedPractice Committee,2 6 the court enjoined the sale of will
forms by a lay person, advancing the following rationale:
Settling claims secures an individual's legal rights with respect to such claims, and
involves the use of legal skill and knowledge.
Id. at 333.
120. See Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 91-137
(1991) (discussing the ethical consequences of a third-year law student acting on behalf of an
attorney at a deposition).
121. See Pulse v. N. Am. Land Title Co., 707 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Mont. 1985) (filling in blanks
in forms for instruments dealing with land deemed the practice of law); see also Joyce Palomar, The
War Between Attorneys and Lay Conveyancers-Empirical Evidence Says "Cease Fire!," 31
CONN. L. REV. 423 (1999).
122. See Or. Bar v. Ortiz, 713 P.2d 1068, 1070-71 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that advising
customer about what benefits are available under immigration law, how to obtain benefits, and what
forms to use is the practice of law).
123. See United States v. Hardy, 681 F. Supp. 1326, 1328-29 (N.D. 111.1988) ("[C]ommon
sense dictates that the drafting of even a simple complaint or an uncomplicated petition for
dissolution of marriage requires at least some degree of legal knowledge or skill."); Statewide
Grievance Comm. v. Harris, 683 A.2d 1362, 1362 (Conn. 1996) (enjoining nonlawyer divorce
document preparation service); cf Nowicki v. Voss, No. 94-2919, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30369, at
*1-2, 13 (7th Cir. Nov. 20, 1996) (precluding paralegal and reporter for Divorced Dads Against
Discrimination from representing another member in divorce proceeding, over constitutional
objection).
124. See Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Patton, 683 A.2d 1359, 1360-61 (Conn. 1996)
(enjoining service that prepared divorce, bankruptcy, corporate, and estate documents and stating
that "the preparation of legal documents is commonly understood to be the practice of law").
125. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 209 (1990) (discussing developments in the lay practice of law); Alicia R.
Bromfield, Comment, The Florida Bar v. American Senior Citizen Alliance: Is "Gathering the
Necessary Information" the Unlicensed Practice of Law?, 12 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 523 (1998)
(analyzing the possible ramifications of the court's failure to define "gathering the necessary
information" by nonlawyers).
126. 438 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
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A will "form" as distributed by defendants is almost a will itself. The
"form" purports to make specific testamentary bequests in the planning
of estates of potential decedents. By reading defendants'
advertisements, by reading the will form, and by reading the
definitions that are attached, the unsuspecting layman is led to believe
that defendants' will "form" is in fact only a form and that all
testamentary dispositions may be thus standardized. The assumption is
misleading and certainly will lead to unfortunate consequences for any
layman who might rely upon the "form" and the definitions attached.
Lest this case be considered to be a relic of the past, consider the
1992 opinion by the Texas Court of Appeals in Fadia v. Unauthorized
Practiceof Law Committee.' In that case, the court enjoined the sale of
a book entitled You and Your Will: A Do-It-Yourself Manual"9 The
court reasoned:
Because a will secures legal rights and involves the giving of advice
requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, the preparation of a will
involves the practice of law. No phase of law requires a more profound
learning on the subject of trusts, powers, taxation law, legal and
equitable estates, and perpetuities than preparing a will. An unlicensed
person, untrained in such30complex legal subjects, cannot perform these
duties for someone else.1
Apparently untroubled by the fact that this was a book and not a
live human being, the court took the position that this was not "simple
layman's advice," but rather "the practice of law" because Fadia
"purports to advise a layperson on how to draft a will," and "[r]eliance
on his forms leads to a false sense of security and often unfortunate
circumstances for the general public."''

As we shall see in the next

section, the stringency of Texas case law had a dramatic effect on the
battle over the sale of will preparation software just a few years later.
For an example of possible regulatory reaction to the proliferation
of scrivener sites, we need look no farther than the Texas litigation over
a CD-ROM called Quicken Family Lawyer. The battle over that CDROM, which resulted in an injunction from a federal district court
127. Id. at 376.
128. 830 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App. 1992).
129. The book apparently included "information on how to prepare a will," as well as "fill-inthe-blank forms." Id. at 163.
130. Id. at 164 (citations omitted). The court rejected the invitation to overrule Palmer as a
request to "legislate from the bench." Id.
131. Id. at 165. The court sidestepped the First Amendment issue raised by Fadia on the ground
that he had waived his right to complain by not presenting evidence at the summary judgment phase
of his case. See id. at 164-65.
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banning its sale in the state of Texas, followed by an intense lobbying
effort that succeeded in amending the Texas unauthorized practice of
law statute, may be a foreshadowing of what lies ahead for those who
seek to regulate scriveners in cyberspace.
IV.

THE CD-ROM AS SCRIVENER: THE CASE OF QUICKEN
FAMILY LAWYER

In 1998, the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of the Texas
Bar ("UPLC") sued Parsons Technology,'32 the publisher of a number of
popular software packages, including the CD-ROM Quicken Family
Lawyer.'33 Quicken Family Lawyer operated on a principle similar to that
used by online document providers. The software offered over one
hundred different legal forms, including leases, premarital agreements,
and wills, and contained instructions on how to fill them out.34 The
software prompted the user for certain information, and then marked
particular forms as appropriate based on the responses (such as the state
of residence). If the user decided to review a particular legal form, the
software again had a series of prompts to assist in filling in the blanks,
and altered the form accordingly. 36 The software also contained a feature
entitled "Ask Arthur Miller," which permitted the user to select a general
topic and then a specific question, and obtain either an answer in text or
a sound and video image of Harvard Law School professor Arthur Miller
answering the question.137 The Committee contended that the sale of this
software violated the state's prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law. The Texas unauthorized practice of law statute in effect
at the time was similar to provisions in other states. Specifically, section
81.101 of the Texas Government Code defined the practice of law as
follows:
132. The Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee of the Texas Bar ("UPLC"), made up of six
Texas lawyers and three lay citizens appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas, has the
responsibility for enforcing Texas' unauthorized practice of law statute. See Unauthorized Practice
of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. 3:97-CV-2859-H, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999).
133. Among its products are Quicken Financial Software, Turbo Tax, and Webster's Talking
Dictionary. See id. at *3.
134. See id.
135. See id. at *5.
136. See id. at *6.
137. See id. at *7. The opinion admits that none of this information is tailored to a set of
specific facts, but rather "answers a number of predetermined frequently asked legal questions in the
general topics of estate planning, family and personal, powers of attorney, health and medical, real
estate, employment, financial, corporate, consumer and credit, and common questions." Id. at
*7 n.4.
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(a) In this chapter the "practice of law" means the preparation of a
pleading or other document incident to an action or special proceeding
or the management of the action or proceeding on behalf of a client
before a judge in court as well as a service rendered out of court,
including the giving of advice or the renderingof any service requiring
the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparinga will, contract,
or other instrument, the legal effect of which under the facts and
conclusions involved must be carefully determined.
(b) The definition in this section is not exclusive and does not deprive
the judicial branch of the power and authority under both this chapter
and the adjudicated cases to determine whether other services and acts
not enumerated may constitute the practice of law.

On January 22, 1999, the district court adopted the reasoning of the
UPLC, and held that the sale of this computer software in Texas violated
its unauthorized practice of law statute.'39 Relying heavily on Texas
precedent,' 40 Judge Barefoot Sanders concluded that the software

"purports to select" the appropriate

document, "customizes

the

documents," and "creates an air of reliability about the documents,
which increases the likelihood that an individual user will be misled into

relying on them."' 4' The fact that the product also contained a disclaimer
had little influence on the district court.'42 In short, Judge Sanders
concluded that:

138. TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.101(a)-(b) (Vernon Supp. 2002) (emphasis added).
139. See ParsonsTech., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813, at *18.
140. The UPLC contended that Quicken Family Lawyer acts as a "high tech lawyer by
interacting with its "client" while preparing legal instruments, giving legal advice, and suggesting
legal instruments that should be employed by the user." Id. at *13-14. As noted in part 1II, supra,at
least two Texas cases had previously employed an expansive reading of the "practice of law." In the
1969 case of Palmerv. UnauthorizedPractice of Law Committee, 438 Sv.2d 374 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969), the court had held that the sale of will forms with instructions constituted the unauthorized
practice of law. In the more recent case of Fadiav. UnauthorizedPractice of Law Committee, 830
S.W.2d 162 (Tex. App. 1992), the court enjoined sale of a do-it-yourself will manual, reaffirming its
earlier conclusion in Palmer that no personal interaction between a putative lawyer and a putative
client was required for a finding of unauthorized practice of law. See id. at 164.
141. ParsonsTech., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813, at *18.
142. See id. at *18-19. The disclaimer read as follows:
This program provides forms and information about the law. We cannot and do not
provide specific information for your exact situation. For example, we can provide a
form for a lease, along with information on state law and issues frequently addressed in
leases. But we cannot decide that our program's lease is appropriate for you. Because we
cannot decide which forms are best for your individual situation, you must use your own
judgment and, to the extent you believe appropriate, the assistance of a lawyer.
Id. at *4-5. The court criticized the disclaimer as not diminishing the "false impression" given by
the software, explaining: "This disclaimer does not appear anywhere on QFL's packaging.
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[The software] goes beyond merely instructing someone how to fill in
a blank form. While no single one of QFL's acts, in and of itself, may
constitute the practice of law, taken as a whole Parsons, through QFL,
has gone beyond publishing a sample form book with
instructions, and
4
1
has ventured into the unauthorized practice of law.
The court also rejected the contention that the statute itself requires
personal contact between a putative lawyer and a putative client, reading
paragraph (b) of the statute to give a court ample authority to conclude
"that services provided to the public as a whole, as opposed to a singular
client, qualify as the practice of law." ' 4 As a federal court sitting in
diversity, it also declined the invitation to construe the statute to require
such a relationship.' 45 Finally, although it called the question "close," the
court rejected Parsons's claims that the application of the Texas
unauthorized practice of law statute to its software violated the First
Amendment, explaining that the statute "does not 'substantially burden'
more speech than necessary, and that the government's interest would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation."' 4 6 It candidly explained:
Absent the regulation, as it is being applied in this case, the State's
ability to combat the unauthorized practice of law in the computer age
would be hindered. The State possesses an interest in protecting the
uninformed and unwary from overly-simplistic legal advice. The
UPLC does not seek to prevent the simple provision of information
concerning legal rights; rather, it seeks to prevent the citizens of Texas
from being lulled into a false sense of security that if they use QFL
they will have a "legally valid" document that's "tailored to [their]
situation" and "best meets their needs." If the UPLC is prevented from
prosecuting Parsons, the State's interests in preventing those who are
not authorized to practice law from giving legal advice would be less
effectively achieved. '47
The court, therefore, enjoined the sale of the CD-ROM within the state
of Texas.'48

Additionally, it does not appear on subsequent uses of the program unless the user actively accesses
the 'Help' pull-down menu at the top of the screen and then selects 'Disclaimer."' Id. at *5.
143. Id. at* 19.
144. Id. at *20.
145. The court noted that this very argument had been made and rejected in Fadia. The court
indicated that it was likely that the Texas Supreme Court would follow Fadia, and that it was not
inclined to "impose a new interpretation of a state statute which has been on the books in its current
form since 1987, and some form since 1939." Id. at *20-21.
146. Id. at *29.
147. Id. at *29-30.
148. See id. at *32-33.
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The district court's opinion sparked immediate controversy.'49 The
attorney for the UPLC, Mark Ticer, defended the opinion, explaining:
"We're just the first state that has moved on this. Parson's forms are
inherently misleading ....We think people should have access to legal
information ... but if I didn't intercede on this until after people were
ripped off, I'd be criticized."'"5 However, a vigorous lobbying campaign
persuaded the Texas State Legislature to amend its unauthorized practice
of law statute to permit software like Quicken Family Lawyer.' In
response, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit
5 2
vacated and remanded the district court's opinion in Parsons.
The particular battle between a group of Texas lawyers and a
software manufacturer may well be over. But the larger war over
unauthorized practice of law remains anything but settled.5 3 It is not
difficult to imagine that similar challenges may be brought in the future
to online scriveners or legal software manufacturers, particularly if these
entities manage to capture any significant share of the market for routine
149. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, Bar Exam: State Lmyers Sharply Divided on Whether Ban
Should Be Lifted on Do-lt-YourselfLegal Softvare, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Apr. 21, 1999, at 1D;
Wendy R. Leibowitz, Lawyers, $15.95 a Box, NAT'L L.J.,
Feb. 22, 1999, at A18 (describing the
controversy); Matt Richtel, Texas Committee FightsSpread of ElectronicLegal Advice, CYBER L.J.,
Sept. 3, 1999. The Committee reportedly received the 1999 Muzzle Award from the Thomas
Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression. See Polly Ross Hughes, Bill to Lay Down the
Law on Self-Help Sofnvare, HOUSTON CHRON., June 13, 1999, at 1.
150. Leibowitz, supranote 149.
151. See Julee C. Fischer, Note, Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protectionor
Protectionof the Legal Cartel?,34 IND. L. REv. 121, 132 n.84 (2000). The amendment had almost
unanimous support in the Texas Legislature, passing the House by a vote of 138-2 and the Senate by
a vote of 26-4. See Hughes, supra note 149. As ultimately adopted, the amendment to section
81.101 read as follows: "the 'practice of law' does not include the design, creation, publication,
distribution, display, or sale ...[of] computer software, or similar products if the products clearly
and conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the advice of an attorney." H.B.
1507,
76th
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(rex.
1999),
available
at
http://wwwcapitol.state.tx.us/tlon6R/billtext/HB01507F.HTM
(last visited Mar. 20, 2002).
Quicken's disclaimer notes: "Because we cannot decide which forms are best for your individual
situation, you must use your own judgment and, to the extent you believe appropriate, the assistance
of a lav,yer." Richtel, supranote 149.
152. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir.
1999) (per curiam). For general discussions of this litigation, see William H. Brown, Comment,
Legal Sofnvare and the UnauthorizedPracticeof Law: Protectionor Protectionism, 36 CAL. W. L.
REV. 157 (1999); Steve French, Note, When Public Policies Collide: Legal "Self-Help" Software
and the Unauthorized Practiceof Law, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 93 (2001); Fischer,
supra note 151; Marie A. Vida, Comment, Legality of Will-Creating Sofnvare: Is the Sale of
Computer Softvare to Assist in Drafting Will Documents Considered the Unauthorized Practice of
Law?, 41 SANTA CLARA L.REv. 231 (2000).
153. Indeed, some opponents of the measure argued that it violated principles of separation of
powers for the legislature to define the practice of law, but that contention apparently has not been
pressed in court since its passage. See Hughes, supranote 149.
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legal documents.'" Mark Ticer argues: "Ultimately, the kinds of
mistakes and problems you'll see won't manifest themselves for years
down the line," until
wills done with do-it-yourself software are
5
contested in court.
Does the Parsons Technology litigation effectively resolve the
question of scriveners in cyberspace? One might argue that the case
demonstrates that the sale of automated document preparation is
unauthorized practice under traditional principles, since the Texas
Legislature found it necessary to amend its unauthorized practice of law
statute to exclude this kind of activity. On the other hand, Judge
Sanders's reasoning is not without controversy, particularly because he
perceived no distinction between advice provided by a live person and a
CD-ROM. 5 6 Indeed, the district court's opinion seems to expand
principles of unauthorized practice beyond their traditional boundaries,
by banning the sale of generic, nonspecific, written instructions
accompanying legal forms.
There is one additional area in which the debate over lay legal
document preparation has been especially significant because it has
received congressional attention. Although it has received little attention
outside the specialized world of the bankruptcy courts, the proliferation
of lay bankruptcy petition preparers has generated a federal statute and a
substantial amount of litigation. This body of law provides additional
insight into the question of unauthorized practice by scriveners, because
some of these cases specifically address the use of computer software to
prepare documents for lay people. But many of these cases also reflect
some of the risks inherent in deregulating the preparation of legal
documents, as many bankruptcy judges have expressed concern about

154. Nolo Press, perhaps the best-known publisher of self-help legal publications and software,
had been the subject of investigation by the same Texas committee since 1998. See Richtel, supra
note 149. As of September 21, 1999, that investigation had been terminated in response to the
legislative amendment on unauthorized practice of law. See Letter from Stephen A. Moyik,
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, to Peter D. Kennedy,
Counsel to Nolo Press (Sept. 21, 1999), available at www.nolo.com/texas/fromLPL.htm] (last
visited Feb. 12, 2002). There are signs that New Jersey's Unauthorized Practice Committee may be
investigating a grievance filed by the New Jersey State Bar Association against some Intemet legal
information providers, but the grievance and investigation have as of yet been kept confidential. See
Robert G. Seidenstein, Online Forms; Crossing The Line Into Legal Advice?, NJ. LAW., Apr. 23,
2001, at 1.
155. Richtel, supra note 149; see also Mark A. Ticer, Self-Helpless, RECORDER, Mar. 10,
1999, at 5 (referring to "radical opponents" of the opinion).
156. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. 3:97-CV-2859-H,
1999 U.S. Dist LEXIS 813, at *19-21 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir.
1999).
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the quality of the legal documents prepared by lay practitioners. It is to
this area of law that I now turn.
V.

SCRIVENERS IN BANKRUPTCY COURT: THE CONTROVERSY OVER
"BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARERS"

In 1994, as part of a comprehensive overhaul of federal bankruptcy
law, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to regulate so-called
"bankruptcy petition preparers" who were said to be preying on poor,
uneducated debtors and taking advantage of their plight.5 7 The
legislative history to this amendment reflects the concern that prompted
this regulation:
[Section 110] adds a new section ... to create standards and penalties
pertaining to bankruptcy petition preparers. Bankruptcy petition
preparers not employed or supervised by any attorney have proliferated
across the country. While it is permissiblefor a petition preparer to
provide services solely limited to typing, far too many of them also
attempt to provide legal advice and legal services to debtors. These
preparers often lack the necessary legal training and ethics regulation
to provide such services in an adequate and appropriate manner. These
services may take unfair advantage of persons who are 58ignorant of
their rights both inside and outside the bankruptcy system.

The new legal provision, 11 U.S.C. § 110, sets forth required
standards and penalties for petition preparers.'59 Specifically, § 110
prohibits petition preparers from executing documents on behalf of
debtors,'6' using the term "legal" in their advertisements, 16 or receiving
payment from the debtor for court fees in connection with the petition."
This law also imposes liability on petition preparers for negligent

157. Article I, section VIII of the United States Constitution gives Congress the sole power to
enact bankruptcy laws. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o
establish.., uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.").
158. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 56 (1994) (emphasis added), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3340, 3365; see also In re Hobbs, 213 B.R. 207, 210-11 (Bankr. D. Me. 1997) (discussing
legislative history).
159. See 11 U.S.C. § 110 (2000).
160. Seeid.§ 1l0(e)(1).
161. See id. § 110(f)(1) ("A bankruptcy petition preparer shall not use the word 'legal' or any
similar term in any advertisements, or advertise under any category that includes the word 'legal' or
any similar term."). For cases enforcing this provision, see, for example, In re Farness, 244 B.R.
464,468-69 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000), and In re Wagner, 241 B.R. 112, 121 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999).
162. See 11 U.S.C. § l10(g)(1).
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preparation of bankruptcy forms, 63 and subjects fees received from
preparers to review and limitation if they are excessive.'6 Section 110
also specifically addresses the issue of unauthorized practice of law,
stating: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit activities
that are otherwise prohibited by law, including rules and laws that
prohibit the unauthorized practice of law."' 65
Section 110 was the subject of some controversy. Critics assailed
the amendment, alleging that it was nothing but an attempt by lawyers to
protect a lucrative legal market.' 66 Nevertheless, bankruptcy courts
believed it was a method to protect uneducated consumers.167

163. See id. § ll0(i)(1) This section states:
If ...a bankruptcy petition preparer violates this section or commits any fraudulent,
unfair, or deceptive act, the bankruptcy court shall certify that fact to the district court,
and the district court, on motion of the debtor, the trustee, or a creditor and after a
hearing, shall order the bankruptcy petition preparer to pay to the debtor-(A) the
debtor's actual damages; (B) the greater of-(i) $2,000; or (ii) twice the amount paid by
the debtor to the bankruptcy petition preparer for the preparer's services; and (C)
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.
Id.; see also id. § 110(j)(2)(A) (imposing civil liability if a bankruptcy petition preparer has
misrepresented experience or education, or engaged in "any other fraudulent, unfair, or deceptive
conduct").
164. See id. § 110(h)(2) ("The court shall disallow and order the immediate turnover to the
bankruptcy trustee of any fee ... found to be in excess of the value of services rendered for the
documents prepared.").
165. Id. § 110(k).
166. See, e.g., Joseph A. Guzinski et al., Section 110 and the Problem of Petition Preparers,
1997 AM. BANKR. INST. J., available at 1997 ABI JNL LEXIS 119, at *6 (describing how critics
argued before the National Bankruptcy Review Commission that "lawyers, judges and the U.S.
Trustees have used this provision to force bankruptcy petition preparers out of business and to
protect the pocketbooks of the lawyers"); see also Susan Adams, The Guild Fights Back, FORBES,
Nov. 18, 1996, at 102 ("[B]ankruptcy trustees, lawyers and judges are working hard to protect the
coin they receive from the lucrative personal bankruptcy market ....[T]o the bankruptcy bar's
dismay, paralegals ... are chipping away at the fee structure, using inexpensive offices and the
same legal software many law firms use, to underprice the full-price lawyers."), quoted in Guzinski,
supra, at *6-7.
167. The District Court for the Central District of California, known as the "bankruptcy
capital" of the country with twenty-one bankruptcy judges in 1996, explained its frustration with
petition preparers who had "taken unconscionable advantage of bankruptcy debtors ....[including]
incompetent preparation of papers, misleading and/or false advertising, charging excessive fees and
other false and deceptive practices." See Interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 110 Which Governs Conduct of
Non-Lawyer Bankruptcy Petition Preparers and Delineating the Relationship, Powers and Functions
of the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court Under the Statute, 198 B.R. 604, 606 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 6, 1996). "The statute is intended, and in this court will operate, as a consumer protection
device, not as a restraint on competition." In re Moore, 232 B.R. 1, 6 (Bankr. D. Me. 1999); see In
re Fraga, 210 B.R. 812, 818-19 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997); In re Rausch, 213 B.R. 364, 369 (D. Nev.
1997); In re Hobbs, 213 B.R. 207, 210-11 (Bankr. D. Me. 1997); In re Hartman, 208 B.R. 768, 776
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1997).
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During the seven years since § 110 became law, bankruptcy courts
have repeatedly attempted to define the conduct that is permissible for
lay petition providers. Generally, the trigger for sanctions has been a
finding by the bankruptcy court that the bankruptcy petition preparer
provided some type of legal advice to the debtor.'68 In some cases,
however, the court has imposed sanctions based on the sale of forms or
other written information, regardless of whether the forms were tailored
to the specific factual circumstances of the debtor. 6 9
A number of bankruptcy courts have issued injunctions banning
bankruptcy petition preparers from engaging in the unauthorized practice
of law, based on the way they prepared legal forms. The particular
conduct said to constitute legal advice is ordinarily the selection of
which exemptions to be claimed, or the determination of how to
categorize certain debts. 170 Several cases address the use of computer
software to prepare documents for consumers. A typical case is In re
Wagner, 7' in which the bankruptcy petition preparer routinely selected
exemptions to be taken by Chapter 7 debtors, determined how debts
were to be categorized, and made "other important legal decisions" for
debtors. 72 The court identified a variety of errors made in the selection
and categorization of information, and also found that the bankruptcy
petition preparer had violated prior orders to cease and had persisted in
using the misleading title "Esquire" in his advertising. 73 In response to
the bankruptcy petition preparer's claim that he did nothing but "enter[]
the information provided me by the [d]ebtor on the computer,' ' 74 the
court responded by quoting the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of California in In re Kaitangian:

168. See, e.g., In re Moore, 232 B.R. 1, 7-8 (Bankr. D. Me. 1999); In re Hobbs, 213 B.R. at
218.
169. Although bankruptcy proceedings are governed by federal law, bankruptcy courts look to
state law when determining whether there has been unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., In re
Stacy, 193 B.R. 31, 38 (Bankr. D. Or. 1996).
170. These cases often involve other fraudulent conduct. See In re Ellingson, 230 B.R. 426,
435 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1999) (finding unauthorized practice of law where paralegal not only gave
advice, but instructed customers to lie to court if asked about her role); In re Stone, 166 B.R. 269,
269, 275 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994) (discussing situation where a nonlawyer associated with an
attorney to circumvent a prior order).
171. 241 B.R. 112 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1999).
172. See id. at 114.
173. See id. at 119. As to the title "Esquire," the court noted that it was "in our experience ...
used exclusively by attorneys, [which] in itself appears to constitute a violation of this statute." Id.
at 115.
174. Id. at 116.
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The Court finds that [the Respondents'] contention that the Bankruptcy
Specialty Software "does it all" is disingenuous. Plugging in solicited
information from questionnaires and personal interviews to a
prepackaged bankruptcy software program constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law. Moreover, advising of available
exemptions from which to choose, or actually choosing an exemption
for the debtor with no explanation, requires the exercise of legal
judgment beyond the capacity and knowledge of lay persons.

A similar recent case is In re Moffett, 76 where the court held that a
lay bankruptcy petition preparer had engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law by advising her customers about what exemptions to
claim, and by using a questionnaire from the clients as the basis for what
to type into a computer program, because "transferring information from
the questionnaire to the official bankruptcy forms invariably will require
some legal judgment. This Court has no problem with [the lay preparer]
using a computer program, but she is only permitted to receive
7
information from potential debtors on official bankruptcy forms."'"
A number of other courts have taken a similar approach to the use
of software. 7 1 In the case of In re McDaniel,79 the court found
175. Id. at 119 (quoting In re Kaitangian, 218 B.R. 102, 110 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1998)). Similar
is In re Stacy, 193 B.R. 31, 38-39 (Bankr. D. Or. 1996), where the court relied on expert testimony
to conclude that to engage in the following activities constituted unauthorized practice of law in
bankruptcy court:
(1) suggest values for personal property if those values are based on a statutory amount;
(2) advise a customer whether to include personal property on bankruptcy schedules;
(3) suggest to a debtor to schedule a car that he or she intends to buy in the future;
(4) suggest exemptions; (5) submit a letter to the court objecting to a proposed dismissal;
(6) advise a customer to tell creditors that the nonlawyer is a lawyer, (7) advise a
customer not to make payments to creditors in the context of a bankruptcy; (8) advise
someone to file a Chapter 13 case instead of a Chapter 7 case because a student loan
would not be discharged in a Chapter 7; (9) recommend that a debtor file under one
particular chapter rather than another; (10) prepare a Chapter 13 plan; (11) classify debts;
and (12) advise regarding the recovery of a tax refund.
Id. at 39.
176. 263 B.R. 805 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2001).
177. Id. at 815.
178. See, e.g., In re Famess, 244 B.R. 464, 472 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000). The court reasoned,
with respect to the defendant petition preparer, that:
He is not saved by his use of preprinted bankruptcy forms or bankruptcy software which
automatically placed the information he solicited from the Debtors' into the appropriate
schedule. [The lay preparer's] approach requires debtors to rely on his judgment as to the
forms required to successfully file and prosecute a bankruptcy case, his use of computer
software to ensure that information is correctly disclosed, and his resources as to what
exemptions were available and the legal authorities supporting those claims.
Id. at 472; see also In re Bradshaw, 233 B.R. 315, 330-31 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999) (observing that
"defendants' entire enterprise was based upon the unauthorized practice of law," because they
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unauthorized practice of law by a lay petition preparer that used
commercial computer programs to prepare bankruptcy petitions. The
court described his transgression as follows:
[The lay preparer] tells his "clients" that he does not practice law, but
he then proceeds to give them legal advice. He asserts that all he does
is pass along to them information which is provided by the courts,
which is in the Bankruptcy Code, or which is in published bankruptcy
materials. He states that his clients could get the same information at a
public library. But [he] does not give information; he gives advice. He
applies the statutes, rules, and information from publications to the
facts of the particular case. He selected how creditors would be treated
in the case, he gave advice concerning reaffirmations, and he
counseled with the McDaniels concerning various matters, including
the claiming of exemptions.'so
In addition to these cases, some courts have imposed penalties
under § 110 merely for selling forms or other written materials to
debtors. It merits noting that some of these decisions relied on the broad
power granted under § 110 to control fees charged to debtors, rather than
on specific findings that the bankruptcy petition preparer had engaged in
unauthorized practice of law. Nevertheless, the cases reflect judicial
concern with the possibility that lay people might be victimized by
incorrect or fraudulent legal information.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has
been particularly active in this area. In its decision in In re
Campanella,' l for example, the court enjoined the operations of the
"Divorce and Bankruptcy Center" ("Center"), operated by a nonlawyer,
which sold "bankruptcy kits" consisting of written instructions for filing
bankruptcy.' The operator of the Center asserted that official
bankruptcy forms were "purposefully devised by lawyers to be
incomprehensible to lay persons and that the mysteries of the forms
could be unlocked by the use of his kits, the text of which he wrote
himself, allegedly after consultation with lawyers."'83 Moreover, his kits
explained the differences between Chapters 7 and 13, defined legal terms, solicited financial
information from their customers to prepare their schedules, prepared motions for customers, and
advised them which exemptions to take, etc).
179. 232 B.R. 674 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999).
180. Id. at 678-79.
181. 207 B.R. 435 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).
182. The Divorce Bankruptcy Center ("Center") purported to be providers of "do-it-yourself"
kits, and denied that it provided legal advice or even typing services for the forms. See Campanella,
207 B.R. at 437.
183. Id.at438.
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included some disclaimers, purporting to warn debtors that they should
hire lawyers if their bankruptcy petitions were "complicated."'
Although the court detailed a myriad of inaccuracies and falsehoods
contained in the bankruptcy kits, it noted that § 110 did not reach the use
of bankruptcy kits when the petitions were prepared by the debtors and
not by third parties.' 5 Thus, it had to determine
whether the Center had
18 6
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
The court recognized that "[t]he Pennsylvania courts have
understandably been unable to specifically define the practice of law,
except to say that it is more than mere appearances in court and the
conduct of litigation and that it involves the application of legal
knowledge and technique."' 8 It instead determined that unauthorized
practice of law is implicated "whenever and wherever the services
require legal knowledge, training, skill, and ability beyond those
possessed by the average man.' 88 Thus, the court stated that "it is clear
that the preparation of pleadings and other types of legal papers and
giving of advice in legal matters constitutes the practice of law, because
all of these activities require a familiarity with legal principles which are
beyond a layperson's knowledge."'' 9 Here, however, the nonlawyer had
not prepared pleadings nor had he given advice; he had simply sold
instructions and "kits" for bankruptcy. Although early precedent in
Pennsylvania provided some basis for treating such sale as unauthorized
practice of law,' 9° the court found that the law on the sale of kits was in
"a state of flux," and thus did not hold that the nonlawyer's conduct here
constituted unauthorized practice of law.' 9' Instead, the court publicly
criticized the nonlawyer's business as "a public nuisance which [is]
taking advantage of their customers' ignorance of both how easily and
cheaply pro se bankruptcies can be filed on one hand, and how
important competent legal advice for those not willing to take the chance
of appearing pro se can be on the other hand."'92 It instead used its power
184. See id. at 441.
185. See id. at 443.
186. See id. at 443-44.
187. Id. at 444.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 444-45.
190. See id. at 445 (discussing a Pennsylvania case where sale of "A Practical Aid for
Executors and Administrators of Decedents' Estates," which purported to give legal advice and
instructions on how to draft wills and manage decedents' estates, held to be unauthorized practice of
law despite assertion of First Amendment claim).
191. Seeid.at450.
192. Id. at 449. The owner of the Center had previously been sued by the New Jersey State Bar
Association for the unauthorized practice of law in selling divorce kits. See N.J. State Bar Ass'n v.
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to order disgorgement under § 110, based on its finding that the Center
had grossly overcharged its customers for "basically useless
information."'93
Similar is In re Agyekum,' 9' in which the petition preparer sought to
charge the debtor a "document license fee" for what he termed his
"copyrighted intellectual property" in a set of preprinted bankruptcy
materials. 95 The court disallowed such a fee, reasoning that under state
law, the practice of law is defined as "legal advice and counsel and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are
secured although such matter may or may not be pending in a court."' 96
Although the document preparer attempted to analogize his documents
to those provided by Nolo Press, the court rejected this argument.'9 7
Rather, the court held that the written materials at issue "not only
provided information about the bankruptcy process, it provided
information on what to consider when filing bankruptcy as well as a
glossary of bankruptcy terms," and "functioned to solicit information to
be used to complete bankruptcy schedules. Soliciting information from a
debtor which is then typed into schedules constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law."'98
The bankruptcy cases give some guidance about how courts might
view document preparation by lay practitioners in cyberspace. Indeed,
they reinforce the traditional dividing line between typing information
into a form and advising about how the form should be prepared.
Moreover, they demonstrate that unauthorized practice issues are not
avoided simply by relying on a computer program to assist in making
selections. Bankruptcy judges have found it to be unauthorized practice
of law for the preparer to make judgments about which form to use or

Divorce Ctr. of At. County, 477 A.2d 415 passim (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1984). In that case, the
court had concluded that the Center did more than simply sell kits, but rather that its employees also
gave advice to customers, some of which was inaccurate or fraudulent. See id. at 417. Because the
Center's actions went beyond merely selling kits and instructions, the additional conduct constituted
the unauthorized practice of law. See id. at 420-21. In the Campanellacase, the court explained that
there was no evidence that the center had provided any advice at all, which would otherwise have
made it a "very easy case." See Campanella,207 B.R. at 443.
193. Id. at 436.
194. 225 B.R. 695 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998).
195. The written materials consisted of about 170 pages of bankruptcy-related information,
including a "Fast Facts Guide" and "InfoForm Questionnaire." See id. at 701.
196. Id. In addition, specific guidelines for bankruptcy preparers in the Northern District of
California precluded the type of services allegedly provided in this case, such as "[blow to respond
to the bankruptcy forms," and "[w]hat exemptions should be claimed." Id.
197. See id. at 702.
198. Id.
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how to categorize certain information furnished by the consumer. '9 It is
difficult to see a meaningful distinction between that activity and the
types of services provided by many of the legal document websites I
have previously discussed.
The significance of the litigation over bankruptcy petition
preparers, however, goes far beyond the precedential value of the
opinions I have discussed. These cases emphasize that there are
legitimate consumer protection issues raised when untrained and
unlicensed lay practitioners prepare legal documents for other lay
people. Many of the bankruptcy judges have expressed concern, if not
dismay, over the quality of the legal documents purchased by
unsuspecting lay people.m Although some of these cases involve
misrepresentation or negligence by unscrupulous entrepreneurs trying to
make a quick buck, others arose because honest lay practitioners, who
genuinely believed they were providing a valuable service, made basic
errors because of their lack of adequate training or experience with the
complexities of the bankruptcy codes.2"'
The question of consumer protection as one of the purposes for
unauthorized practice of law statutes is one that deserves renewed
consideration. Much of the critique of unauthorized practice of law
statutes has stressed that the driving force behind enforcement is to
protect the legal profession's lucrative monopoly on providing legal
services. Undoubtedly, there is some truth to this claim. But there is
another side to this equation that the bankruptcy cases reflect. An
unregulated market in the selling of personalized legal documents could
create new problems for consumers if their rights are inadequately
protected or even harmed by the documents they receive.
If legal document services begin to flourish in cyberspace, the legal
profession will have to consider whether to challenge them under the
unauthorized practice statutes or otherwise regulate them. Despite the
large body of law that would seem to give bar regulators the legal basis
to pursue these websites, however, there may be substantial obstacles to
aggressive enforcement of unauthorized practice principles against them.
In particular, the free speech implications inherent in the sale of
199. See, e.g., In re Bradshaw, 233 B.R. 315, 330-31 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1999); In re Moore, 232
B.R. 1, 7-11 (Bankr. D. Me. 1999); In re Hobbs, 213 B.R. 207,218 (Bankr. D. Me. 1997).
200. See, e.g., In re Rausch, 213 B.R. 364, 367 (D. Nev. 1997); In re Hartman, 208 B.R. 768,
776 (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 1997).
201. See, e.g., Moore, 232 B.R. at 9 (recognizing, but dismissing, that defendant "stress[es] to
his customers that he is not an attorney and that he cannot and will not provide them with legal
representation"); Hartman, 208 B.R. at 775, 778-79 (finding that petition preparer's ignorance of
§ 110 did not excuse his violations of the statute).
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information related to the law may generate significant constitutional
concerns. Moreover, it is not clear as a policy matter that pursuing these
websites would be effective or wise. Although a lengthy discussion of
these questions is beyond the scope of this piece, I close with a few
preliminary observations on the potential pitfalls ahead for bar
regulators.
VI.

ENFORCING THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW STATUTES
AGAINST SCRIVENERS IN CYBERSPACE:
SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS

The first question to consider about sites like Desktop Lawyer or
LegalZoom is whether the services they provide could be said to
constitute the practice of law under existing precedent. This question is
entirely separate, in my view, from the more difficult question of
whether it would be wise to pursue remedies under that body of law.
Services like Desktop Lawyer and LegalZoom are simply more
sophisticated versions of the scrivener services that proliferated in the
Seventies and Eighties. The case law is fairly consistent in taking the
position that generating legal documents for lay people, whether done
over the Internet or in an office, constitutes the unauthorized practice of
law if the provider of the form furnishes any kind of "advice. ' '2r Further,
the courts have consistently taken the position that selecting which form
to use, giving advice about which information ought to be included in a
form, or soliciting information from a lay person and then making
determinations about how to use the information in the form is the
equivalent of practicing law. °3
A website that provides a questionnaire to consumers, and then uses
the information on the questionnaire to generate a personalized legal
document, presents the easiest case. At least under existing precedent,
the act of determining how to use the raw information provided by the
consumer, whether by selecting forms or by categorizing documents in
certain ways, is "legal advice," and thus constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law. On the other hand, a website that either sells blank forms
for the consumer to fill out, or that uses a computer program to insert the
202. See, e.g., N.J. State Bar Ass'n v. Divorce Ctr.of At. County, 477 A.2d 415,418-19 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1984) (finding unauthorized practice of law where "the purveyor of a legal kit
goes beyond the mere sale of printed material and begins to engage in activity which includes
explaining or recommending particular forms and making judgments as to how a particular
individual should fill them out").
203. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Am. Senior Citizens Alliance, Inc., 689 So. 2d 255, 259 (Fla. 1997)
(per curiam).
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consumer's raw information directly onto a form, is also an easy case, as
it would seem to be acting as nothing more than a scrivener and thus
exempt from unauthorized practice concerns.
The more difficult kind of service is a website that uses an
automated program to convert raw data from the consumer into the
personalized legal document7 4 The Quicken Family Lawyer CD-ROM
is this kind of program. With these programs, no live human being
interacted with the consumer to produce the legal document, so it is
more difficult to identify the "legal advice" that is essential to finding
unauthorized practice. On the other hand, live human beings did design
the computer program and determine what automated recommendations
it should make to consumers depending on the information provided.
Although this seems to be one step removed from the scrivener cases of
the past, the fact that Texas successfully pursued an unauthorized
practice of law claim against Quicken Family Lawyer, and that a specific
amendment to the state's unauthorized practice of law statute was
apparently necessary to resolve the issue of liability, suggests that
concern about this kind of software is more than just theoretical.2 5
The problem is that the courts traditionally have held that advising
a consumer on what form to select, or where on the form to place the
information, is itself "legal advice," and this is precisely what many of
the websites do. But the question posed by computerized form selection
is whether "advice" in this context means the conscious application of
knowledge and judgment to a set of facts by a live human being, or
whether "advice" can include developing an automated system of
prompts that indicates to the consumer which forms should be selected
and what information to place in the blank spaces. The automated
services provided either by CD-ROM, as in Quicken Family Lawyer, or
by the downloading of documents over the Internet, as in Desktop
Lawyer, have cleverly eliminated the part of form preparation that
historically had created the unauthorized practice of law difficulty-the
fact that it is nearly impossible for a live person to fill out forms for
another person without giving "advice." In these services, the computer
software does it all; no lay person is involved in manually inputting the
information, or in selecting the necessary form. Rather, a computer
program has been devised that makes these selections automatically.
There is a good argument to be made that automated document
204. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
205. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. 3:97-CV-2859-H,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999); see
also supranote 152 and accompanying text.
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preparation is more like Norman Dacey's famous best-seller than like a
live lay practitioner, and as such cannot be said to constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
I cannot predict with any degree of certainty how the courts would
react to an unauthorized practice of law claim brought against an online
document preparer, although both the Quicken Family Lawyer case and
the bankruptcy form preparer cases suggest that the courts are likely to
be receptive to such claims. It may well be that the distinction I have
suggested between a live typist in the Seventies and a computer program
today may not be legally significant. That program did not emerge fullgrown like Athena from the head of Zeus; rather, it was created by live
human beings and the decision as to what documents would be
recommended based on the answers was made by live human beings.
But as we consider an interpretation of unauthorized practice of law
that would reach not only personalized legal advice from a live human
being, but also software that would give the illusion of such advice, we
must not lose sight of the broader implications of such a reading. In
particular, enforcing unauthorized practice statutes against this kind of
activity would undoubtedly generate constitutional challenges. Although
a full discussion of these issues must await another day, I will highlight
just a few issues that could pose serious threats to any aggressive pursuit
of document preparers in cyberspace.
First and foremost in any consideration of how the unauthorized
practice of law statutes might be susceptible to constitutional challenge
is, of course, the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. The
First Amendment has been raised repeatedly in defense of the rights of
lay people to provide legal information to others, with some success.
Norman Dacey, for example, successfully persuaded the Second Circuit
that his First Amendment rights were violated by attempts to suppress
his book."' More recently, Judge Barefoot Sanders considered the First
Amendment implications of banning the sale of Quicken Family Lawyer
in Texas. °7 Judge Sanders ultimately concluded that this ban passed
constitutional muster, although the question was "close," because it was
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression," but rather was aimed
at "eradicating the unauthorized practice of law," and did not

206. See supraPart II.
207. See Parsons Tech., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 813, at *21-30 ("While there is no right of
unlicensed laymen to represent another under the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of
association and freedom to petition one's government, Parsons' rights under the First Amendment's
protections of a free press still apply.") (citation omitted)).
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substantially burden more speech than necessary. 2° The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit never reached the merits of this holding
because the intervening change in the unauthorized practice of law
statute rendered the issue moot.
Judge Sanders's opinion notwithstanding, there would be
substantial First Amendment problems with the enforcement of
unauthorized practice of law statutes against legal information providers.
I see particular problems with the bar making a successful showing that
the suppression of the sale of personalized forms would be no more
burdensome than necessary to achieve the state's objective. This is
especially problematic because of the historic difficulty with defining
the practice of law that I described at the outset of this Article.20 It is
harder to argue that a particular restriction on speech is carefully tailored
to suppress only the "unauthorized practice of law," and not legal
information or other speech about the law, if no one can agree on what
the definition of the practice of law is. 210 Moreover, there undoubtedly
will be arguments that the legal profession is seeking not to protect
consumers by its actions, but rather to silence a particular political
message about consumer self-help and the irrelevance of the legal
profession."' In order to pursue scrivener websites successfully, the bar
will have to convince the courts on the First Amendment issue, and how
it would be resolved is anyone's guess. Other constitutional issues may
also lurk in unauthorized practice of law prosecutions against online

208. Id. at *24-25, 27, 29 ("[T]he Court finds that the Statute is aimed at the
noncommunicative impact of Parsons' speech, and therefore, is a content-neutral regulation which
only incidentally affects speech and therefore is subject only to intermediate scrutiny.").
209. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
210. I hope to address these issues in more detail in a future article. For general discussions of
First Amendment issues presented by regulation of legal advice as unauthorized practice of law, see
Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241
(1999); Robert Kry, The "Watchman for Truth": Professional Licensing and the FirstAmendment,
23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885 (2000).
211. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544-45 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice
Jackson opined that a distinction must be drawn between the constitutional power of a state to
"regulate the pursuit of a vocation" and an individual's constitutional right to freedom of state and
assembly. See id. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring). He reasoned:
A state may forbid one without its license to practice law as a vocation, but I think it
could not stop an unlicensed person from making a speech about the rights of man or the
rights of labor, or any other kind of right, including recommending that his hearers
organize to support his views. Likewise, the state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as
an occupation without its license, but I do not think it could make it a crime publicly or
privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject any school of medical thought.
Id. (Jackson, J., concurring); cf. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (holding that the SEC is
limited in its ability to regulate publishers of nonpersonalized investment advice).
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information providers.1 2 Although at this point I have given only the
most cursory consideration to the constitutional implications of
regulating these websites, I wish at this juncture only to highlight the
fact that even if unauthorized practice of law statutes are applicable to
the conduct of online "legal information providers," there are substantial
constitutional roadblocks that may weaken any enforcement effort.
The final question, then, is whether continuing to permit legal
document providers to operate in the unregulated world of cyberspace is
the wisest option for the legal profession to pursue. Even if we assume
that the courts would respond favorably to a concerted enforcement of
the unauthorized practice statutes against these websites, an assumption
that may be optimistic at best, we must consider the ramifications of
such enforcement. The public reaction would likely be negative.
Enforcing unauthorized practice of law statutes against online document
preparation services would be neither painless nor popular. The lay
public, which already detests lawyers, generally perceives unauthorized
practice of law enforcement as yet another way for the legal profession
to line its collective pockets at the expense of consumers. 3 In addition,
it is at least possible that these websites are managing to provide some
consumers with a necessary service-basic legal documents at an
affordable price. At a time when the bar seems to have abdicated its
responsibility to provide routine, noncomplex legal services to the poor
and middle class, it could well be counterproductive to try to shut down
one vehicle for serving those unmet needs.
Nevertheless, I must confess to deep ambivalence about the
prospect of an unregulated new industry that is marketing what are
clearly legal services to unsuspecting lay consumers. Indeed, although
212. For instance, there are cases holding that state unauthorized practice of law statutes may
not be used to interfere with the protection of federal rights. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
490 (1969) (striking down prison regulation that forbade inmates from assisting other inmates in
preparing writs or other legal forms). Justice Douglas maintained, in his concurrence, that:
There are not enough lawyers to manage or supervise all of these ffairs; and much of
the basic work done requires no special legal talent. Yet there is a closed-shop
philosophy in the legal profession that cuts down drastically active roles for laymen ....
That traditional, closed-shop attitude is utterly out of place in the modem world
where claims pile high and much of the work of tracing and pursuing them requires the
patience and wisdom of a layman rather than the legal skills of a member of the bar.
Id. at 491-92 (Douglas, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted); see also Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Va.
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) ("[fn regulating the practice of law a State cannot ignore the rights
of individuals secured by the Constitution."). Other possible constitutional issues include challenges
under the dormant Commerce Clause, if state unauthorized practice of law statutes are used to
interfere unreasonably with interstate commerce, and separation of powers claims that regulating the
unauthorized practice of law are within the inherent powers of the courts and not the legislatures.
213. See Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly, supranote 5, at 3.
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some members of the legal profession may consider these websites to be
providing a valuable service, I wonder how many of us would be happy
to learn that our parents had purchased their will through a dot-com.
There are real consumer protection issues that we cannot simply ignore
by terming all bar attempts to regulate unauthorized practice of law as
nothing but economic protectionism. The information given may be
false or misleading. The forms may be outdated or not suitable for use
for a particular set of facts. There is no follow-up to ensure that the
appropriate documents were used, or whether additional assistance was
necessary. Consumers themselves may be misled into thinking that they
have resolved their legal difficulties without realizing that the documents
they have paid for are woefully incomplete. Finally, we have no way of
knowing how courts will react in the future, when the first dot-com wills
are probated or divorce papers challenged, and turn out to have been
inadequate under the law." 4
How this issue is to be resolved, then, remains a question for the
future. However, it is essential for us as a profession to think seriously
about how we are going to address the proliferation of these services in
cyberspace. The most famous scrivener of them all, Herman Melville's
Bartleby, responded to all requests from his employer that he take action
with an insistent "I would prefer not to. ' ' 21 5 The legal profession cannot
afford its continued inaction on scriveners in cyberspace. Indeed, we
must think seriously about what constitutes the practice of law in the
twenty-first century, before that practice is defined out from under us.

214. A compromise position would be to permit lay document preparation but impose training
and licensing requirements and provide specifically for consumer protection. Such a solution is
beyond the scope of this discussion.
215. HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET 32 (Simon
& Schuster 1997) (1853).
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